{"id":898,"date":"2019-04-23T07:20:37","date_gmt":"2019-04-23T07:20:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/?p=898"},"modified":"2019-04-23T07:20:37","modified_gmt":"2019-04-23T07:20:37","slug":"john_chuan-tiong_lim_one_country_two_systems","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/2019\/04\/23\/john_chuan-tiong_lim_one_country_two_systems\/","title":{"rendered":"John Chuan Tiong Lim  \u201dOne Country, Two Systems\u201d- Four Primary Factors For Non-Support by Taiwanese society &#8211;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>On January 2, 2019, Xi Jinping made his significant announcement about the \u201cfive principles\u201d directed at the unification of Taiwan and China. It was a guideline for Taiwan by Beijing authorities in the \u201cnew era\u201d of Xi Jinping. \u00a0In the wake of this announcement, Taiwanese media became a daily frenzy of debates and the issue was analyzed and commented on from various perspectives. The Taiwan issue, an old yet new issue, was heating up. However, what many people in Taiwan could not understand was why Beijing authorities adhered to \u201cone country, two systems\u201d, as the only system for the unification of cross-strait relations despite it never have been accepted in Taiwanese society for over forty years.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u30fbNegative reactions in Taiwan against \u201cone country, two systems\u201d \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The two major political parties (ruling and opposition) in Taiwan, expressed their different reactions against the unification outlined in Xi\u2019s five principles\uff08\u7fd2\u4e94\u6761\uff09. In the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, Tsai Ing-wen herself stated that Taiwan absolutely would not accept the \u201cone country, two systems\u201d ideology, and said \u201cwe adhere to an opposition to \u201cone country, two systems\u201d as a will of the Taiwanese people, an absolute majority. This is the \u201cTaiwanese Consensus.\u201d\u201d Her comments were not unexpected.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>What Beijing authorities focused their attention on was the attitude of the Nationalist Party headed by Wu Den-yih. On the day after the announcement of \u201cXi\u2019s five principles\u201d, they reacted by releasing a statement consisting of six clauses from the cultural diffusion committee in the Central Committee of the Party. According to their statement, they emphasized strongly that they support the \u201cconsensus of the year 1992 (92\u5e74\u30b3\u30f3\u30bb\u30f3\u30b5\u30b9)\u201d. This means that both China and Taiwan recognize \u201cone China,\u201d but different interpretations of the expression \u201cone China\u201d are permitted. Mr. Wu, however, avoided direct reference to Xi\u2019s definition of the \u201cnew content\u201d of the \u201c1992 consensus,\u201d saying that \u201cboth sides endeavor toward the unification of China\u201d. However, he indirectly rejected Xi\u2019s proposal by saying that \u201cat this stage, it would be difficult to get full support for \u201cone country, two systems\u201d from the majority of Taiwanese.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Following this, public opinion surveys about \u201cXi\u2019s Five Articles\u201d and \u201cpeaceful unification, one country, two systems\u201d were announced one after another. One survey, which was conducted and released by the Committee of Cross-Strait Policy think tank on January 9, showed 80.9% of Taiwanese were against \u201cone country, two systems\u201d. Only 13.7% were for the system. Shortly after, the Mainland Affairs Council held a press conference on January 17 to release the results of a public opinion survey. According to the Council, 75.4% of Taiwanese were against \u201cone country, two systems\u201d and only 10.2% were for the system. Moreover, 74.3% do not accept the content of the \u201c1992 Consensus\u201d, namely that \u201ccross-strait areas belong to \u201cOne China\u201d and both sides make efforts for unification\u201d. Only 10% of citizens in Taiwan accepted the contents of the \u201c1992 Consensus\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u30fbThe impact of democratization and localization in Taiwan <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Since the 1990s, the Mainland Affairs Council as well as media outlets have conducted numerous opinion surveys of how Taiwanese people feel about \u201cone country, two systems\u201d. The number of respondents choosing \u201cagree\u201d has never exceeded 30%. We can examine the following four factors for \u201cnon-support\u201d in Taiwan to \u201cone country, two systems\u201d from the results gathered over these forty years.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Since the 1990s when Taiwanese society went through \u201clocalization (\u672c\u571f\u5316)\u201d, the majority of the public opinion has never supported unification. Before the 1990s, the Taiwanese Nationalist Party, as a surviving government of the Republic of China in 1949, set the \u201cunification of China\u201d as a national policy. This was followed by the \u201ccounter-attack (\u5927\u9678\u53cd\u6297)\u201d by Chiang Kai-shek and \u201cThree Principles of the People\uff08\u4e09\u6c11\u4e3b\u7fa9\uff09\u201d by Chiang Ching-kuo. \u00a0Up until the early period of Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s, there was a \u201cNational Unification Council\u201d which set a \u201cNational Unification Party Platform\u201d. However, after 1994, the recognition of Taiwanese people as \u201cChinese\u201d underwent a change owing to the flourishing of the localization movement in Taiwan and promotion of constitutional reform. Under such political and social change, the ideology of cross-strait unification lost its mass appeal in Taiwan. Even when the Taiwanese Nationalist Party headed by Ma Ying-jeon returned to political power in 2008, neither the \u201cNational Unification Council\u201d nor the \u201cNational Unification Party Platform\u201d were revived, and the government adopted a policy to \u201cnot unify\u201d in cross-strait policy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Taiwanese society understands that \u201cone country, two systems\u201d would lead inevitably to the disappearance of the \u201cRepublic of China\u201d. This is not accepted by the Taiwanese Nationalist Party. There is still a clause in the charter of the Party which states that \u201cthere is no change in the consistent pursuit of our goal, prosperity and unification of our country\u201d. This is consistent with the idea of the unification of the nation printed in the \u201cNational Unification Party Platform\u201d. As it refers to national identity in terms of the national polity of the \u201cRepublic of China\u201d as a country and for the pursuit of unification of China under the flag of the \u201cRepublic of China,\u201d unification does not mean relinquishing the ideal of the \u201cRepublic of China\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The framework for unification outlined by the Beijing authority for \u201cone country, two systems\u201d is a logic of unification based on the disappearance of the Republic of China. It is hardly acceptable by \u201creal\u201d supporters of the Taiwan Nationalist Party.<\/p>\n<p>Accordingly, as far as the framework for \u201cone country, two systems\u201d does not include the possibility of returning to a \u201cRepublic of China\u201d, the Nationalist Party would never change their attitude. It goes without saying that people in Taiwan who support the Nationalist Party, having been strongly affected by localization in Taiwan, would also never change their minds .<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u30fbKey Point<\/strong><strong>\uff1aThe Taiwan version of \u201cOne Country, Two Systems\u201d and cross-strait positionality \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Relations between the mainland and Taiwan in the framework of \u201cone country, two systems\u201d outlined by Xi Jinping are understood by many as a relation of \u201ccentral government and local government\u201d. After the political democratization of the 1990s, this proposition is hardly acceptable by Taiwanese society. The \u201cone country, two systems\u201d proposal for Taiwan submitted by Xi Jinping was an unfinished manuscript and not clear about relations between the mainland and Taiwan. \u738b\u82f1\u6d25, a mainland scholar, is seeking to understand the relation between the straits as a special and conditional relation of \u201ccentral government and semi-government\u201d. Such theories are based on the principle of \u201csecuring general sovereignty by the central government\u201d which was proposed by a scholar in the Institute of Taiwanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Science. In other words, it would be very hard for major political parties and society in Taiwan to accept the idea of unification under \u201cone country, two systems\u201d if they are unable to show the possibility of a \u201ccentral government and local government\u201d relationship.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Twenty years have already passed since \u201cone country, two systems\u201d took effect in Hong Kong. However, this case does not provide any successful examples for Taiwan. As you may know, \u201cone country, two systems\u201d in Hong Kong and Macao was a plan toward unification with Taiwan. The Beijing government understands \u201cone country, two systems\u201d in Hong Kong as a success, as Xi Jinping has commented at the 20<sup>th<\/sup> anniversary of the return of Hong Kong in 2017 as well as in the announcement of the five principles earlier this year. There is a gap, however, between such official governmental opinion and the actual feelings of people in Taiwan and Hong Kong. One can guess that even in Hong Kong people are losing their trust in \u201cone country, two systems\u201d.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>According to a survey by the Public Opinion Survey Project in Hong Kong University, in the year 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to China, 63.9% of Hong Kong citizens \u201ctrusted\u201d \u201cone country, two systems\u201d. Only 18.5% did not trust the policy.<\/p>\n<p>However, according to a recent survey, 21 years after the enforcement of \u201cone country, two systems\u201d in Hong Kong, only 45.5% of Hong Kong citizens responded that they \u201ctrust\u201d the system. This figure of 45.5% is lower than the 46.9% who expressed \u201cdistrust.\u201d \u00a0Moreover, the popular elections were unable to bring about a \u201csoft landing,\u201d and the \u201cOccupy Central \/ Umbrella Revolution\u201d which broke out in 2014 in Hong Kong made people in Taiwan distrust \u201cone country, two system\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Nobody knows how \u201cone country, two systems\u201d in Taiwan will be presented in the future. As to factors which affect Taiwanese society negatively, as mentioned above, if the Beijing side is unable to change their stance and enact a bill which would be acceptable various groups in Taiwanese society including the Nationalist Party. If Beijing just one-sidedly wants the Taiwanese side to change their minds towards \u201cone country, two systems\u201d and the unification of both sides of the strait, it will remain wishful thinking.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/active\/sgra\/2019\/12447\/\">SGRA Kawaraban 585 in Japanese (original)<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>(John Chuan-Tiong Lim \/ Researcher in Japan Research Institute in Taiwan, Chief of Japan Research Center, Wuhan University )\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Translated by Kazuo Kawamura<\/p>\n<p>English checked by Sonja Dale<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp; On January 2, 2019, Xi Jinping made his significant announcement about the \u201cfive principles\u201d directed a [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-898","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-kawaraban"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/898","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=898"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/898\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=898"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=898"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aisf.or.jp\/sgra\/english\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=898"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}