

34<sup>th</sup> SGRA FORUM

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8<sup>th</sup> Asian Future Forum of Japan and Korea

## East Asian Regional Concept and Chinese View of Japan and Korea

### ■ The Concept of this Forum

The East Asian concept, with its inter-relationships, is very complicated. In this forum we and the learned speakers will examine this concept from comparative viewpoints which became popular from the latter of the 1990s. We will also study the features of the Chinese view of Japan and Korea, which is a big element of this concept. After the presentation by each speaker a panel discussion will follow and then an open forum. Japanese and Korean translations of the presentations and the discussions will be provided.

## What is SGRA?

Sekiguchi Global Research Association is mainly formed by foreign researchers, from various countries, who have come to know Japan well through their long stay as foreign students in pursuit of their doctoral degree from Japanese graduate schools in various fields. SGRA undertakes research and problem-solving recommendation which are useful for the policy- or strategy-making of individuals and organizations confronted with globalization. SGRA widely announces its results to society through such means as forums, reports and home pages. Thematic research teams are formed by researchers from various fields and nationalities, who research by analyzing and studying multilateral data gathered through their various knowledge and networks. SGRA aims at activities that are international and multi-disciplinary, encompassing a wide range of research area for the whole society and not just for specialists of certain fields. The basic objective of SGRA is to contribute to the realization of good global citizenship

**Program** 34<sup>th</sup> SGRA FORUM

8th Asian Future Forum of Japan and Korea

# East Asia Regional Concept and Chinese View of Japan and Korea

Moderator	Kim Woonghee (Associate Professor, Inha University (Korea), Economics & International Trade)、SGRA Researcher)
Time	February 21 (Sat.) 2009, 14:30 – 17:30 (followed by cocktails)
Place	The Tokyo International Forum, The Glass Tower No.409 Conference Room
Sponsor	Sekiguchi Global Research Association (SGRA)
Co-Sponsor	The Center for Future Human Resource Studies(Korea)、 Atsumi International Scholarship Foundation
14:30–14:40	Opening Address: Imanishi, Junko SGRA Chief Representative Atsumi International Scholarship Foundation Managing Director  Opening Greeting: Lee, Jin Kyu (President, Center for Future Human Resource Studies) Professor, Korea University, Business School
14:40–15:00	<b>【Report 1】</b> <b>Japanese Concept of East Asia – Its History and Now –</b> <b>Hirakawa, Hitoshi</b> (Professor of Graduate School of Economics、 Nagoya University, SGRA Advisor) <span style="float:right">5</span> <hr/> <p>In Japan, the concept 'East Asia Community' suddenly became popular this century. The extreme manifestation of the Japanese concept of East Asia was the 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' , but the concept became taboo after the Second World War. A half century has passed and the debate about East Asia Community has risen again. How a nation and its people relate to this issue is very important. Actually, the question is how do Japan and East Asia understand and relate to this issue? In his report, Professor Hirakawa reviewed the features of the concept of East Asia in Japan from the 20th Century to the present. We would like to know his present viewpoint.</p>
15:00–15:20	<b>【Report 2】</b> <b>Korean Concept of East Asia – Korean Regionalism –</b> <span style="float:right">24</span> <hr/> <p>Sohn Yul (Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University)  Professor Sohn Yul described the features of Korean regionalism in the context of East Asia, comparing them with the strategies on regionalism of Japan and China, with respect to scope, identity and methodology. In his report, he took up, as the main example, 'the concept of the time of North East Asia' and 'the theory of the balance of power in North East Asia'</p>

15:20–15:40	<p><b>【Report 3】</b></p> <p><b>Japanese View of China</b> <span style="float: right;">33</span></p> <hr/> <p><b>Kawashima, Shin</b> (Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Arts and Science)</p> <p>Public opinion poll on diplomacy in Japan on ‘feel familiarity to China’ in 2008 showed a rating of 31.8% which was the lowest rating ever. The poll also disclosed that in China the ‘feel familiarity to Japan’ increased. This past perception of Japan and China deteriorated this year. Why? In this report, Professor Shin Kawashima summarized the Japanese view of China from a historical perspective based on the result of investigations of the past 30 years and examined the situation of last year.</p>
15:40–16:00	<p><b>【Report 4】</b></p> <p><b>Korean View of China</b> <span style="float: right;">40</span></p> <hr/> <p><b>Kim Sangbae</b> (Associate Professor, Seoul National University, Political Science and International Relations)</p> <p>The recent rise of China as an economic power has attracted the interests of East Asian countries. What are possibilities and limits of China of the 21st Century from the viewpoints of Korea? Does this preeminence of China manifest the advent of territorial political and military hegemony? Or, is it a challenge of a new and big industrial country as ‘a factory of the world’ ? In this report, Prof. Kim Sangbee tried to determine the potentials of China through the viewpoints of the theory of world politics and diplomacy of the 21st Century vis-à-vis the theory of 富国強兵 (enrich a country and strengthen an army). Chinese potentials, which are understood in such context, depend on ‘knowledge’ and ‘network’ which are the keywords of the 21st century.</p>
16:00–16:15	<p>Break</p>
16:15–17:30	<p><b>Panel Discussion</b> <span style="float: right;">47</span></p> <hr/> <p>Facilitator <b>Kim Woonghee</b> (Associate Professor, Inha University (Korea), Economics &amp; International Trade, SGRA Researcher)</p> <p>Supplementary Comment</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Japanese/Korean View of China from the viewpoint of China</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><b>Lee Gangzhe</b> Professor, Hokuriku University, School of Future Learning</p> <p>Panelists : Above Presenters</p>
17:30	<p><b>Closing Address: Shimazu, Tadahiro</b> SGRA Secretary General</p>

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Session

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# Japanese Concept of East Asia

## — Its History and Now —

by **Hitoshi Hirakawa** (Professor of Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University, and SGRA Advisor)

### Preface

In this 21st century, the concept of “East Asia Community” is in vogue. But, many people are still skeptical whether this concept would last long and consequently materialize. At present, many people dream of this “Community” as the Japanese future, though at the same time as many people are in doubt about it.

At present, the growth of the Japanese economy relies heavily on Asian and, particularly, Chinese economic growth. On the other hand, the global financial crisis which started from the Lehman Brothers debacle in September 2008, has placed a heavy burden on the present international economic system to study and search for measures that may prevent similar shocks in the future. A current idea which has become a big issue in Japan is the necessity of setting up a new cooperative standard for rebuilding the global economic system, particularly in East Asia, and Japan’ s role in this effort.

When we look back to our history, the Asian view or concept of the modern Japanese is one who has gotten out of isolation and has changed greatly along with each stage of the Japanese economic growth. Consider our relationship with the European Great Powers: how to maintain the independence of Japan, then our ambition to be one of the Powers, and our defeat in that effort at that stage.

After a half century, we began to talk again actively about East Asia. And we are getting interested in history again through the discussion about East Asian Community.

Consider how we, Japanese, have thought about East Asian System. I, myself, am not a specialist on this subject, but I would like to approach this issue as a researcher of Asian economy, though these are my personal and tentative assumptions.

## Modernization of Japan and East Asia

### Modernization of Japan and Asian-ism: Based on the Asian-ism by Ko Takeuchi

After the defeat of Japan in World War II, Asia-ism was taboo for discussion by Japanese. Defeated at the “Greater East Asia War” , (the name of this War has been changed to “Pacific War” ) and after Japan’ s selection of reconstruction and progress under the American Far Eastern and Asian Strategy, Japan modified its Asian strategy to an incidental issue in Asian Strategy in conjunction with our own progress at post-war restoration. Whether for this reason or not, we can say that nobody, except specialists have shown any interest in studying or reviewing how Asia was discussed before the War. For the Japanese, in general, this issue was put aside from their interest, considering the more pragmatic interest in day-to-day survival .

Under such a situation, this paper is our humble contribution towards, at least putting a historical perspective on Japan’ s thoughts and ideas on Asianism.

The first study about Asianism before the War would be “Asianism” (1963) by Ko Takeuchi, which tackled this issue in a straightforward manner. “An explanation of the view on Asianism” by Takeuchi is the starting point of discussion. He referred to the long explanation about “Greater Asianism” of “Dictionary of Asian History” (published by Heibonsha) as “relatively close to his own understanding” .

The following passages are part of his explanation:

An opinion, in order to resist the invasion of Asia by American and European Powers, the Asian people should stand together with Japan as the leader. The movement of Asian Solidarity has been discussed since the beginning of the Meiji Era in conjunction with preservation of Japanese Independence, from Western colonization, especially among the opinion leaders of the The Freedom and Popular Rights Movements. Such opinion was developed in various versions. Emori Ueki developed his theory of Freedom and Equality into international relationship to justify the movement of Asian People to unite as equals. Moreover, he developed his idea into a kind of Utopia of World Government. Tokichi Tarui and Kentaro Oi insisted that each country in Asia should develop their democracy and necessarily unite together with all other Asian countries. Tarui and Oi especially stressed that this development and unification should be the mission of the Japanese people.

In 1887 (Meiji 20th), the idea of Asian Solidarity of such democratic people changed to Pan-Asianism following the retreat of the Freedom and

Popular Rights Movement. Asian Solidarity involved the establishment of a system or mechanism in Japan by the Emperor, and the expansion of armaments against the Ching dynasty. It was in 1887 when Genyo-Sha abandoned their notion of “Popular Rights” in favor of “Nation Rights” (Takeuchi 1963: 9-10).

Takeuchi said, explaining several differences in ideas between the Dictionary and his understanding, thus: “My Asianism is not an ideology which has substantial contents and are objectively limited, but one of just following the tendency of labelling ideas. It can only be categorized as Asianism or non-Asianism, or rightist or leftist” (Takeuchi 1963: 12)

As to concept of “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” , ‘during World War II, this ideology was a goal of Asianism in one sense, and in another sense a deviation or tendency from Asianism. If Asianism would be a substantial ideology and could be developed historically, its goal should naturally be “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” . I have to say that such ideology was ruined with Japan’ s defeat in the war. For a certain period after the war, this fact and explanation was dominant. ….. Actually, however, “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” could be said as a ‘false ideology’ which was established through the suppression of “every other ideology” , including Asianism. … . This suppression of ideology started from being leftist to freedom and finally rightist. Ideologues who have survived are “the ones who surrendered to the suppression or who altered their opinion to become non-ideologists” (Takeuchi 1963: 13-14). Takeuchi listed such ideologists as Soho Tokutomi, Saneatsu Mushanokouji, Mituru Touyama, Yoshitaro Hirano and others. This process of change or conversion is discussed in the following paragraphs.

## Japan and East Asia at First Part of Meiji Era

In the Meiji Era, the interest in Asia started from “Seikan-Ron” (the policy of conquering Korea by military force) in 1873. The war started from an accidental shooting by the Korean Army against a Japanese warship and ended in Korea’ s defeat, which forced Korea- to “Open” to Japan. After Japan won the war, Japan and Korea concluded in 1876 the Kouka-Island Treaty (internationally described as “the unequal treaty of amity between Japan and Korea” ).

In the 1880s, Japan and China (Ching dynasty) had competed for control of Korea. An armed conflict ensued, and eventually resulted in Japan’ s victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War. The war arose from a conflict in Korea between the “Independent Party” which was supported by Japan and the “Jidai-Party ( 事 大 党 )” which was supported by China. This Korean internal conflict ended with the failure of a coup d’ etat by Gym Okgum of the Independent Party at the end of 1884.

In 1885, the “Osaka Incident” took place after the failure of the coup d’ etat attempt by the Independent Party. The left-wing of the Freedom Party, headed by Kentaro Oi, attempted an armed intervention against Chosun. Tenyu-Kyou(天佑侠), a secret society, established by Genyo-sha (玄洋社) supported the Donghak Party and provoked the Sino-Japanese War.

In 1894 the Sino-Japanese War started between the China which tried to control the Donghak Peasant Revolution (東学党の乱) and Japan which intervened against this Revolution. The victory by Japan in this war ended with the cession of Taiwan to Japan.

In 1904 Japan acquired Korea (Chosun) as a protectorate following Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War.

The decade of 1880 can be said, as the “Dictionary of Asian History” explained and which Takeuchi cited as being very close to his opinion, to be the period when the Japanese Asian view began to change gradually to “Greater Asianism” , in other words, “Invasive Asianism” . In 1885 (Meiji 18th), Tokichi Tarui prepared his draft paper “Consolidation of Greater East Asia” (based on a publication in classical Chinese in 1893) which explained the construction of the union of nations under an equal partnership such as that between Japan and Korea. In the same year, 1885, in the magazine “Jiji-Shinpou” , Yukichi Fukuzawa who had been strongly discouraged by Korea and China, rejected their modernization and insisted on “De-Asia” (getting out of Asia). Those opinions are positioned on both extreme ends. The view on Korea and China was developed under modern Japan as one of the measures for the Japanese growth from an equal position on cooperation or consolidation to utilization. After the victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the assassination of Japanese Prime Minister Hirobumi Itoh by An Jung-geun in October 1909, and “The Treaty of Consolidation of Korea by Japan” in August 1910, the colonization of Korea by Japan was completed.

## “Asia is One” and the China View

In 1903 the book “Ideal of Asia” by Tensin Okakura was published. The book’s first sentence is “Asia is One(Unity)” . Here is what Ko Takeuchi said about Tensin Okakura:

Tensin Okakura (given name was Kakuzou) was isolated from Asianists and stood alone among the thinkers at the time. He did not have any relation with the thinkers of ideas of the age. For Tensin, beauty (and religion have almost the same meaning) has the maximum value, and civilization is only a measure for the materialization of universal value. Beauty is based on the human real nature, and should not be monopolized by the European people. For this purpose, it is an urgent need to reform the present perception that “European glory is Asian indignity” . For this



reform Asia should be “One” .

This statement “Asia is One” was abused by Japanese Fascism, as having the same meaning as “Greater Asia Consolidation” . Tensin's “Asia is One” was his expression of the romantic “ideal” of the process of the Asian people getting back to their real nature from their humiliating situation. So it is completely wrong if we understand this belief as an admiration of Japanese imperialism (Takeuchi 1963: 42-43).

As Tensin had shown interest in Chinese and Indian civilization in his research on renaissance art, Japan began to show interest in China, as well, being conscious of the threat of Russia, which planned progress to Northeast China and Korean Peninsula, and intensifying its sense of rivalry against Russia. At the same time, in the 1910s and 1920s, “Asianism was monopolized by the rightists, while the leftists put proletarian-internationalism on the opposite side. Many leftists dropped out by reason of the nationalist movement. Many people who dropped out embraced “Asianism”

(Takeuchi 1963: 51-52). The spread of Genyou-sha-Kokuryu-kai whose version of nationalism was introduced under the Tenno System became rapid. There were, to be sure, other people who got involved in the philosophical discussions. Touten Miyazaki (1871-1925) was one of them and he joined the Chinese revolution. He wrote “The Thirty-Three Years Dream” , published in 1902, with the bibliographical comment by one of the famous democrats in the pre-World War II period, Sakuzo Yoshino as follows:

“It was valuable as this book was his honest record and I admired his attitude about everything as very innocent and pure. His consistent and pure sympathy towards the Chinese revolution was fair in mind and passionate in the spirit of self-sacrifice, which has made us respect greatly.”  
(Takeuchi 1963: 48)

Miyazaki ‘came to know Gym Ok-gum ( 金 玉 均 ); emigrated to Siam; participated in the independence movement in the Philippines; got involved in the dispute between Kang Youmei ( 康 有 為 ) and Sun Yat-sen ( 孫 文 ) and worked with the Japanese effort to settle the dispute amicably; and consistently participated in the Chinese revolutionary movement after the era of Xinghai Revolution ( 辛亥 革命 ) and thereafter’ (Takeuchi 1963: 46).

However, almost all Asianists came to support Japan’ s going into World War II which was touted as the “Greater East Asia War” , and this belief continued even after the war was lost.

Shumei Okawa (1886-1957), who was prosecuted as an A-class war criminal, became aware of India’ s plight as a colony of England after reading “New India (Revised)” written by Henry Cotton. He found this book at a second-hand bookseller at Kanda in 1913 after his graduation from Tokyo Imperial University. He became an Asia-ist supporting the independence of India. He

wrote “Many Aspects of the Rehabilitation of Asia” in 1922 where he analyzed the reasons for the colonization of Asia as “the separation between spiritual and social” life. He questioned the meaning of the founding of the League of Nations after the end of the World War I; the European class struggle and the suppression of Asian nationalists.

Article 10 of the Agreement by the League of Nations stated “each country of the Nations respects the maintenance of the territorial integrity of each country and the present political independence and promised to protect against external invasion.

Okawa, however, interpreted Article 10 as follows:

“It is simply that this Article takes away the right of subordinate nations to recover their freedom and their right to become bigger powers from being lesser powers, as well as the right of new nations to be successors of old nations. But a rapid pace of the reconstruction of Asia can not be stopped by the United Nations” (Okamoto 1998: 214-215).

In 1925, the incident of May 30, an anti-imperialist movement, occurred in Shanghai, and Okawa at first thought it as “the start of the realization of the people” . However, he soon changed his understanding of this incident right after the beginning of the conquest of northern China by Chiang Kai-shek that threatened the Japanese interest in Manchuria. In 1941 Okawa’ s idea became an ideology of the Greater East Asia War. His understanding was that the world had entered into an era of ultra-nationalism and he was convinced that the establishment of an economic block and political control over Manchuria and Mongolia should be “essential to Japanese existence and accomplishment of a world historical mission” (Okamoto 1998: 216).

There is a commentary on Ikki Kita (1883-1937) who joined the Chinese revolution and was executed as the suspected leader of the February 26 attempted coup d’ etat. It is wrong to label him as an ultra-nationalist and fascist. At that time Russia had dispatched troops to the Boxer Rebellion in Manchuria and did not withdraw the troops even after the rebellion was quelled. Ikki Kita participated in the debate about the Russo-Japanese War in 1903; he defined this war as “a decisive battle between the yellow and white races” . He argued that Japan, as the representative of the yellow race, “should cope with this war for the continued existence of the Asian race” (Okamoto 1998: 180).

In 1912 when the Republic of China was established and Japan entered the Taisho Era, Ikki Kita wrote about the revolution in China in his book “The History of Chinese Diplomacy” . It is said Sakuzo Yosino praised highly this book as “the best work on the history of Chinese evolution” , but Koji Okamoto, on the contrary, said this book criticized Japanese diplomacy. Okamoto wrote:

“It was Japanese diplomacy that Kita criticized strongly in his “History”

. Kita expressed his misgivings about the extravagance which arose from the prosperity of Japan; the worsening relation between Japan and China; and how it could lead to the ruin of Japan itself, if continued. He stressed his contempt for the slave mentality of imploring the strong. The representative of the strong is England. Kita said the purpose of the Russo-Japan War should be the preservation of China and Japanese diplomacy should support that. The Japan-England Alliance was not consistent with the alliance between Japan and China (Japanese Cooperation to Evolutional China) (Okamoto 1998)."

Japan became a strong influence in Asia after World War I, and compelled China to accept the Request of 21 Articles. At that time a movement for the expulsion of Japan from China arose. Kita wrote about this development in his book "General Principle on Reorganization of the Nation" in 1919 in Shanghai. The idea of a "reorganized Japan" and an "evolutional China", according to Okamoto, was an attempt which would "reform the world controlled by Europe and America and promote the liberation and progress of Asia" (Okamoto 1998:198). However, his idea for the "reorganization of Japan" led to the "2.26 incident" organized by young military officers in 1936.

It may be necessary to reconsider the evaluation of Kita as a man of thought. It can be said that Japan, at that time, was in "extravagance" mode and misunderstood his idea as a call against Europe and America. This misunderstanding played a role to drive the military to take control and initiate the invasion. The result was as Kita feared.

In November 1924 Sun Yat-sen (Son-bun) gave a lecture on "Pan-Asia-ism" in Kobe. He contrasted Europe as a "culture of the supreme" with Japan as a "culture of the royal". Sun criticized the Japanese Asian policy that "Japan was degraded under European supremacy or became a strong castle of Oriental royalty" (Sun 1967). At the same time he appealed for the solidarity between Japan and China. Japan, however, grew spiritually as a big nation based on the Tenno (emperor) system, and could not empathize with the other Asian people.

## Morinosuke Kajima and Pan Asia-ism

Morinosuke Kajima (1896-1975) was one of the many people who understood and championed Pan-Asia-ism but who were not given due recognition for their role in promoting this idea. As we look back in history and the discussion of Asia-ism, Kajima's role became evident. He was born in the year following the signing of the Simonoseki Treaty and the Triple Intervention. After graduation from the University of Tokyo, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and worked in the Japanese Embassy in Germany from 1922 to 1925 and in the Japanese Embassy in Italy from 1927 to 1929. In 1926 when he

returned from Germany, he advocated in Pan Asia publishing “the movement of Pan Asia and Pan Europe” . He introduced in Japan the idea of Pan-Europe initiated by Coudenhove Kalergy.

Pan-Asianism appealed to Kajima after he read an article about Pan Europe written by Coudenhove Kalergy. Kajima sympathized with Coudenove’ s advocacy and endeavored to know him.(edited by Kajima Construction 1978:369:Hirakawa 2008a).

Coudenhove formulated the idea for the integration of Europe banking on the feeling of uncertainty and confusion after the end of World War I. This feeling of crisis and despair came from: (1) the heretofore massive destruction of lives and property in the war made more lethal with the development of science and technology being applied to warfare; (2) the fear of Russia in Europe; and (3) the belief that a divided Europe would be defeated by America in an economic war. Kajima applied Coudenhove’ s concept to Asia which he considered as lacking strong leadership and unity. He supported the position of Coudenhove as pragmatic idealism and accepted the system of the League of Nations. He said in Asia , it was also necessary to establish a union or a league of Japan and China. He divided into two the nascent nationalist movement in Asia after World War I. First was the movement in Japan and China, the second was the movement in the Middle East or the Near East, such as India, Persia and Afganistan. The difference between these two movements was that the first was composed of two independent countries while the second was composed of countries that were still colonies. It was an unrealistic dream for Japan, which just recently got modernized, to fight the European Powers with their colonies. He mentioed as follows:

“We have to be prepared to fight those countries like England, France and Holland, if we ask those countries (colonies like India, French Indochina and Dutch Indochina) to join the union of East Asia, and develop a Pan Asia or nonwhite unions. We have to avoid a war that destroys life, economy and culture, and start promptly to be more practical. We have to be satisfied with the fulfilment of the imperfect than with the nonfulfilment of the perfect.(Nagatomi1926:26-27)

The concept of Pan Asia, in a sense assisting the attainment of independence by India, is too spiritual and too non-political. (Nagatomi1926:12)” .

Kajima insisted that Japan should desist from invading China and instead work for the realization of the union between Japan and China. He believed that:

“Both the Japanese invasion of China and the consequent Chinese retaliation would end in the destruction of both Japan and Chine, to the benefit of England, America and Russia. They would divide East Asia like

Africa. The independence of Mongolia would become impossible and its civilization would disappear. If such war policies are to be avoided, the remaining option should be policies of friendship and amity. Japan should absolutely stop thinking of an invasion policy and avoid such policies which are of doubtful value.(Nagatomi 1926:51-56)" .

In 1935, Kajima announced his "New Peace Doctrine" which insisted on anti-war policies saying "positive peace doctrine is the only practical policy in today' s East Asia" . However, in two books published in 1938, he discussed the meaning of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany in 1936 and another Pact among Japan,Germany and Italy in 1937. He wrote that the Pact between Japan and Germany "was the first step to destroy the idea of non-approval of Manchuria, together with the Pact between Japan and Italy. (Kajima1938:36)" . He appreciated at this stage the Fascism of Germany and Italy, but at the same time, he did not conceal his doubt about Fascism. However, again in 1940 he highly praised Adolf Hitler for starting the historical mission towards unifying Europe. In Asia, Japan should fulfil a similar mission. He began to insist that The Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere is the realization of Pan-Asia.(Kajima 1943:2.5).

The first feature of his Pan Asia theory was to expand the movement of unity in Asia in line with the Pan-Europe idea of Coudenhove Kalergy and the subsequent movement of unity of Europe. The rapid unification of Europe by the invasion and conquest of many countries by Hitler convinced many Asianists in Japan to agree with the Japanese invasion in furtherance of the Greater East Asia Co-Propspertiy Sphere. But Kajima knew the superior power of Europe/America as compared with that of Japan. Based on this awareness he formulated a phased unification of Asian countries. However he began to think of his dream of Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere as a basis for an invasion.

His position as an experienced professional diplomat and student of diplomacy enabled him to compare his practical and thoretical ideas with the systems of modern nations. This exercise rationalized his assertions. He understood that the liberation of colonized countries was historically inevitable on the one hand, but on the other hand, he could not accept the theory of revolution which destroys the systems of nations and spilled over national borders. Knowing the European strength and Japanese weak points, he groped for solutions of a framework for peaceful coexistence of nations in the quest for progress. It seems that his strong anti-communism bias came from his position in the management of a private company, as well as from his belief that his own theory cannot accept communism and socialism. It is necessary to record that the Pan Asianism of the diplomat Kajima was the genealogy of Asianism born from an idea which grasped Asia from an outside perspective affected by

the impact of Europe/America..

## “Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere” and “Greater East Asia War” (AsiaPacific War)

In 1931, though this is out of context, the Japanese military perpetrated the Manchurian Incident which led to the establishment of Manchuria the following year. However, the nonrecognition of Manchuria by the Lytton Commission caused Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations in 1933, and ignited the Sino-Japanese War which started from the “July 7 Incident” (Ro-Ko Bridge Incident) in 1937.

In 1939 Germany's rapid military victories in Europe accelerated the progress of Japanese militarization. In July 1940 the second Konoe Cabinet (with Hideki Tojo, as the Minister of War and Yousuke Matuoka as Minister of Foreign Affairs) decided to proceed South towards French Indochina declaring that “the New Order of Greater East Asia” had begun with the armed entry into northern French Indochina(Viet Nam).

The Triple Alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy in September 1940(?) marked the beginning of an attempt to establish the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. In December 1941 Japan finally went to what was called the Greater East Asia War (Asia-Pacific War) by attacking the Malaysian Peninsula and Pearl Harbor.

In November 1943 (Showa 18th), Japan held the “Greater East Asia Meeting” in Tokyo, where the participants were Manchuria, the Nankin Government of China, and the representatives of the Philippines and Burma. Japan approved their independence. Subhas Chandra Bose who was approved as head of a temporary government in India was accepted to attend as an observer. The meeting announced the “Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia ” . The second Greater East Asia Meeting was not held because of the deteriorating war situation. In May 5,1944 (Showa 19th), the “ambassadors’ meeting” was held where only the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors in Japan participated.(by Wikipedia “Greater East Asia Meeting” ). The ambassadors present at this meeting requested to make amendments to the joint declaration issued at the previous meeting but the requests were rejected. The joint declaration stated that the Greater East Asia War was a “liberation war which aimed to liberate Greater East Asia from the fetters of America/Europe” and expressed respect of sovereign independence and mutual assistance. On the contrary, the declaration was actually that of policies of occupation.

Anti-Japan movements cropped up in many places with the deterioration of the war situation. In the event, Japan was defeated by the overwhelming military powers of the Allied Forces, and accepted the Potsdam Declaration in

August 1945.

## Asia-ism in Japan after the War

### Asia Pacific Plan in the era from Restoration to High Economic Growth

It can be said that Japan, after the defeat at the Greater East Asia War, basically utilized the relationship with Asia as its measure of progress. The war responsibility of Japan modified the payment of war damage reparations, which was favourable to Japan and utilized satisfactorily for Japanese economic growth, especially when relations between America and Russia deteriorated into the Cold War. As Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, the chief ambassador plenipotentiary said at the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, “it was the most generous in history” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1951:302).

In August 1955, the now Prime Minister Yoshida expressed in the *Mainichi*(News Papers) as follows:

“We used the word ‘reparation’ because Burma did not want to use ‘investment’ and preferred to use ‘reparation’ . Under the reparation terms Burma would be developed and when being developed, would become a Japanese market.(The *Mainichi* 1955.8.11)”

The reparation issue is now forgotten but we can say that the evaluation of the efficacy of the reparation is not yet final(Hirakawa 2006). It has evolved into ODA(Official Development Assistance). When the Japanese economy could already aim at attaining high growth following the restoration after the war, Japan began to reestablish relationship with Asia. From the Asian countries, a similar movement also began.

I like to mention here several movements together with Japanese thinking on the regional structures of other countries. The first post-war cooperation ideas in East Asia was OAEC (Organization of Asian Economic Cooperation) which was proposed by ECAFE (Economic Committee for Asia and Far East) in 1961. This proposal was written in the report prepared by “the committee of three specialists for Asian economic cooperation” requested by U Nyum, the secretary-general of ECAFE. This idea proposed by Saburo Ohkita, one of three specialists, was discarded mainly because the tendency of the newly independent countries was towards nationalistic economic policy. There was also the feeling of distrust against big powers in the region and the Japanese concern about America, as well as its financial burden. (Wightman1964;329-335) However, it was also mentioned that the main reasons for the defeat of the proposal was the opposition by Japan. According to a recent study, Japan had already decided to oppose the establishment of OAEC as “too early” occurring as it did before getting the opinion of America. Actually, the Japanese opposition came from the Ministry of Agriculture which

claimed that Japanese agriculture would be hit by the liberalization of the entry into Japan of farm products from other Asian countries (Hoshiro 2007).

Japanese opposition to OAEK must be determined by the American intention, even without the issue of the liberalization of farm products. Though Japan had decided on their position before receiving the American position, it can be said that Japanese domestic political structure became clear at that time. This structure has remained today, and according to Hoshiro "it is because of the universal and domestic issue such as the concern with the financial burden and the protection of domestic agriculture. The opposition by the Ministry of Agriculture came from their opposition to the trade itself between Japan and the Asian countries" (Hoshiro 2007:16).

However, the idea of common market was proposed in South East Asia thereafter. According to a newspaper which reported the publication of diplomatic documents of the Laos Department of Foreign Affairs, the then Prime Minister Phouma of Laos proposed at the preliminary meeting in December 1966 for agricultural development in south east Asia. The proposal called for the establishment of a "common market in the region". The proposal flustered "Japan because it was not in the agenda". The Japanese Government opined "we have to be negative" because the main theme of the meeting was for the agricultural and economic development in south east Asia and not of trade in the region (Nikkei 2005.2.25). Because of my insufficient research I cannot conclude whether it is possible to say that the Japanese attitude reflected the negative attitude against the trade of Japanese agricultural products.

In the 1960s, Japan began proposing the Asia-Pacific Trade. Morinosuke Kajima, who proposed Pan-Asia since before the war, was one of the proponents of this concept in Japan. He proposed an "Asia-Pacific Community" in the "Monthly Federation of Economic Organization" in January 1964, and spoke at the budget committee of the House of Councilors (March 5) about the "Asia Pacific Community". He pointed out the regional principles in America and Europe as shown when the EEC was established (Ooba 2004:206). He also proposed "Asia Pacific Community" in the "International Review" (January issue), which he published by himself in 1965, referring to American "Current History" as follows:

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1 In his previous report (Hirakawa 2008:22), the writer said 'he (Kajima) did not mention at all about how Pan Asia would be a league or a union. ... After the War, he explained precisely about movement of the international organization which would be formed in the world after the 1950s and it seems he tried to establish, from such thinking, the union which should be.' But it was a wrong conclusion due to the writer's incomplete research. As touched upon in this report, he adapted the method of functional approach of economics toward Pan Asia and proposed the union of nations. With regards to the handling of communist China, he at first considered it outside of the framework but, later in his life, he dreamt of the materialization of Pan Asia which would include China. As to his theory of Pan Asia late in life, the writer plans to discuss in separate reports as soon as possible.



“If the Asia Pacific Community would be established like an Asian EEC, such plans like the development plan of South East Asia by President Johnson and various plans by ECAFE, Colombo Plan, and many other plans of each country would be implemented effectively. On the other hand, the relation between the Community and Communist China would be in trouble ideologically.

In today’ s world, the Soviet Union has settled to a peaceful coexistence with its foes and has become enthusiastic to peacefully coexist with the Western countries. Let’ s wait patiently for the time when main land China ties up with the rest of Asia, the Pacific and the World, based on friendship, cooperation and freedom. ( “International Review” January 1966).

Recently the foreign policies of Prime Ministers Satou (Eisaku) and Miki (Takeo) importantly include a plan of Asia and the Pacific countries promoting our mission as the only advanced country in Asia to set up such communities. This plan is my Asia Pacific Community itself.(edited by Kajima Research Institute for Peace, 1966:7)” .

For Kajima who formulated Pan-Asia from the Pan-Europe movement, the progress of the unity of Europe showed the correctness of his idea, and the acceptance of his ideas by the political circles had greatly encouraged him. Incidentally, the Asia-Pacific Plan by Miki was said to have been affected by Kiyoshi Kojima who proposed the Pacific Common Market. Kojima said in his chronological record, recollecting PAFTA(Pacific Free Trade Area), which was written when he retired from Hitotsubashi University in 1984, as follows;

I joined the joint research of Bela Balassa one year and half in 1964. The result was published later…….During this joint research , I felt misgivings about the economic growth of Pan Pacific Area and being left behind , comparing the remarkable growth of the European community. This was the starting point of my idea of Pacific Economic Sphere……. In November 1965, Saburo Ohkita held the meeting “Trade and development of under-developing countries” at The Japan Economic Research Center. . . . . My “Pacific Common Market” idea was introduced here for the first time. In March-April 1967, then Foreign Minister Takeo Miki noticed my idea and asked me to get the opinion of the group of scholars whether an international meeting could be held. I visited the United States, Canada, England, Australia and New Zealand and had important discussions with key-persons. / In January 1968, I, as the chairman of the committee, called the meeting PAFTAD(Pacific Trade and Development Conference) at Japan Economic Research Center. I thought at first this Conference would be held only once, but it has been continued even now because participants showed strong interests enthusiastically and became a kind of learned

society. (Kojima 1984:513-514)

The idea of Pacific Community by Kojima came from the critical feeling towards European development by people like Kajima. However, the difference from Kajima's idea was the positioning of "advanced five countries" in the Pacific, and other countries except Japan should be aided or would receive economic cooperation. Kajima proposed the Asian Pacific Community or Asian Pacific Collective Organization which was composed of south east Asian countries besides the "advanced five countries.(Kajima1965:196,203-204) Anyway, in the political world or among researchers, the Pacific and Asia attracted their attention.

By the way, Kajima returned again to the idea of Pan Asia in the 1970s. In his report in 1972, he wrote "I felt strongly the movement towards "Pan Asia" , even in the Asian countries which had various social structures" pointing out the materialization of such international organizations like ECAFE, ADB and ASEAN.( "International Journal" May 1972) In 1973 Summer, I mentioned "I can foresee my hope, establishing Pan Asia, being afforded a fine prospect ahead. ( "International Journal" August 1973) I also returned to the dream of Pan Asia from the idea of Asia Pacific Community. And the "The Union of Asian Countries" was proposed as a transitional organization to Pan Asia, which was composed of the member nations of ECAFE (Economic Committee of Asia and Far East) and ADB (Asian Development Bank) As the way to the materialization, establishment of "Asian Development Fund" , as an "economic and functional approach" , was proposed, keeping the experience of EC (European Community) in mind.(Kajima 1972a : Chapter 5 ; Kajima 1973)

Actually, the international politics in Asia showed a big change in 1960s. It was 1962 when the controversy about China and the Soviet Union started, and in 1964 China succeeded in its nuclear testing, but China was in confusion because of the Cultural Revolution which started in 1966. On the other hand, ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was established in 1967. Japan was in the midst of high economic growth and had been expanding its international trade especially with America and steered strongly to the idea of Asia Pacific Community. Such ideas, as Kajima mentioned, were understood as being against anti-socialism and anti-communism. (edited by Kowarenco and others in 1988 : 68) It may not be wrong to understand that it was an attempt to establish a new framework for the development of Europe by Japan which was becoming an economic powerhouse. We have to notice the new framework for the cooperations of east Asia except Japan was emerging as an awaring of anti-communism.

## The Era of Asia /Pacific and Japan

In 1970s, the international political situation in Asia changed. In 1971,

China became a member of the United Nations. In 1972, President Nixon visited China and the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan followed. In 1973, the Vietnam War ended with the Paris Agreement and the unification of North and South became a reality in 1976. This was the re-settlement based on the retuning of China to the international society and the settlement of Vietnam War. These events brought about the so-called end of the past war period for Japan. In 1976, Japan completed the payment of the reparation to the Philippines and announced “five year doubling plan” to double the ODA in five years. In 1978, Japan prepared the first mid-term plan which resulted in the 1977 record 1.42 million dollars, doubling by 1980 and made Japan one of the major advanced countries. This period can be said to have opened new possibilities for East Asia to grow internationally and domestically.

The structure of economic growth of this period developed toward the formation of the Pan-Pacific economic spheres. In 1980, then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira proposed a conference on Pacific cooperation. The countries that joined a conference were Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the ASEAN Countries, Korea and South Pacific Islands. At these conferences, Japan took the initiative to urge the attending countries to have confidence in the surging economic growth of the region. From the latter part of 1970s, the development of Asian NIES (Newly Industrializing Economies) began to be noticed. The so-called triangle among Japan, the United States and NIES became functional. The interest in the Pan Pacific economy was growing. China finally joined finally to such stream in line with the shift to the reform and liberation route. In 1990s, the entry to the Chinese market by Japan, the United States and other advanced countries began in earnest.

In 1989, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) was born upon the initiative of Australia advocating open regionalism. It is said Japan supported this plan behind the scene. APEC inaugurated the annual conference at ministerial level and adopted the “1994 Leaders’ Declaration” at Bogor, Indonesia in 1994 which declared the liberalization of investment within the region and advanced economies by 2010 and the other economies by 2020. The ideal was the top of liberalization of trade in East Asia at the time of globalization. Yoichi Funabashi, an editorial writer of Asahi (newspaper) who was involved in the materialization of APEC, used the words “Asia Pacific Fusion”. We can say these words reflect the actual situation of that time. (Funabashi 1995)

However, in July 1997 Asian monetary crisis occurred. The special feature of this crisis was that it started from Thailand, and became a “contagion”, making Asian countries come to know the risks of the straight line globalization. Japan at first proposed the AMF (Asian Monetary Fund) idea, but after its failure

due to the opposition of the United States and IMF, Japan proposed the New Miyazawa Scheme which provided financial support to the countries under the crisis amounting US\$30 billion in Japanese Yen. This scheme was accepted by East Asian Countries. With this monetary crisis as a turning point, the regular meeting of ASEAN + 3 leaders changed and conferences at ministerial level of various fields were initiated. In 1999, “the joint statement on cooperation in East Asia” by ASEAN + 3 leaders was adopted for the first time in history. (Hirakawa 2002)

## The Era of advocating “Community” and Japanese Idea for East Asia Region

### The plan for “East Asia Community” by Junichiro Koizumi

In January 2002, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a speech in which he proposed to ASEAN “a community that acts together and advances together” in Singapore, when the JESPA (Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement) was signed. This proposal was understood as the one by the East Asia Community afterwards, but when Koizumi proposed it, he did not think over the meaning of the word “community” as it is now phrased. Kiyoshi Taniguchi comments with noted as follows:

This proposal can be said as a big change of policy of Japan from the multi-lateral liberalization to the regionalism of East Asia and in this sense it is highly evaluated. However, the concept of an “East Asia Community” by Japan was very abstract, and the word “Community” does not mean “community” in the strict sense of the word but seems to mean an ambiguous regional cooperation. Moreover, as the members of “Community” Australia, New Zealand joined beside ASEAN + 3 which was institutionalized since around 1977. Here we can see that the Japanese Government’s intention about “East Asia Community” which is invisible from time to time, should not be limited to ASEAN + 3, but be open to others. Such openness comes from the Japanese Government’s concern about Western Countries especially the United States.

The member countries in the proposal of Koizumi, as Taniguchi mentioned, consist of not only ASEAN or ASEAN+3 (as China said) but also Australia and New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs named the “enlarged East Asia community”, “c” for community is small letter and they did not use the word “community” in Japanese. It was after 1994 when the word

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\* It is noteworthy that ‘an’ and ‘community’ of ‘an East Asian community’ are written by small letters and it does not mean specific communities. (Taniguchi2004:34-35)

“community” (in Japanese) was used and the East Asia Community Council report in their report about policy as follows;

Japanese Government has been changing their words like “a community that acts together and advances together” (January 2002, Koizumi in Singapore), “establishment of East Asia Community” (December 2003, at special top level meeting between Japan/ASEAN), and “East Asia Community” (September 2004, at an address by Koizumi at the United Nations, and January 2005, and at administrative policy by Koizumi). The concept of “East Asia Community” was emerging gradually. (The council of East Asia Community 2005:10)

Actually the word “community” in the Koizumi speech at the United Nations in 2004 was translated wrongly into “Kyou-dou-tai (community)” . Anyway, the community in East Asia was told enthusiastically. Kenichi Itoh, the Chairman of the Council of East Asia Community, mentioned in the record of his speeches as follows;

I think the words “East Asia Community” had been used in East Asia more than 10 years. Japan which realized it recently and liked to correspond to this in surprise and in fluster. It is an actual situation that Japanese use this word, feeling we cannot fail to catch the buses.(Itoh 2005:3)

It may be November 2001 when the words “East Asia Community “ were used first time officially in the report by EAVG (East Asia Vision Group) which was submitted to the meeting by ASEAN + 3 top-level. EAVG was the study committee which was proposed and set up in 1999 by then Korean President, Kim Dae-jung at the ASEAN+3 meetings. The title of this report was “Toward an East Asian Community” . Receiving this report, the meeting by ASEAN+3 confirmed to intensify their cooperation. The final report by EASG (East Asia Study Group) which was submitted to ASEAN + 3 in 2000, proposed the concrete measures to cooperate for establishing East Asian Community.

Why, then, was the proposal by Koizumi born? There is a history that Japan utilized ASEAN as the one of the policies against China. Why on earth, did the materialization of the meeting by ASEAN+3 started from the appeal to ASEAN from Japanese side? In January 1997, then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto proposed the regular top level meeting with ASEAN. In response to this proposal, ASEAN invited the top officials of Japan and China at 30th anniversary meeting of ASEAN top-level meeting. In Hashimoto’ s proposal, there were undercurrents of bad feelings of China and Korea against the review of the guidelines of the agreement of defence between Japan and the United States. We can say that Japan wanted to strengthen the relation with ASEAN first and cope with it. In response to this, ASEAN, from their well-balanced sense, invited Japan, China and Korea to their meeting, and the ASEAN+3 meeting was held.

It overlapped with Asian monetary crisis incidentally and adopted the historical regularization of the meeting. It was the result of ASEAN diplomacy. (Sindo/Hirakawa 2006; Sindo 2007)

The proposal of Koizumi in January 2002 was worked out in opposition to the mutual consent between ASEAN and China to agree with the FTA within 10 years at the meeting of ASEAN+3 2 months before. The sense crisis of Japanese in taking the initiative against Chinese success in approaching to ASEAN FTA resulted in the Japanese proposal of “East Asian Community” .

## Japan and East Asian Community

Why was the East Asian Community or the community born? The understanding of East Asia as one “community” was seen in the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used the expression “a community with common fate” in the report of “the mission for the revival of Asia” which was sent to the countries that suffered from the monetary crisis in August-September 1999. We can say that a certain understanding was born at this time in the Japanese Government. We have to refer to the ASEAN initiatives here again. At the 30th second informal top-level meeting in 1997, ASEAN adopted the “ASEAN Vision 2020” and proposed the concept of ASEAN community as “a community of caring societies” . Actually, in response to the monetary crisis, ASEAN called the meeting of the ASEAN+3, inviting Japan, China and Korea agreed to organize the various conferences at a ministerial level. The idea of East Asian Community by Koizumi could not be realized without the proposal of EAVG and without the reality.

Moreover ASEAN announced the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II” (Paris Concord II) at the top level meeting in 2003. The Declaration aimed at the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economy Community, and ASEAN Social and Cultural Community. In 2004, they adopted the “Vientiane Action Programme” at the 10th top-level meeting and set up a program for establishing the ASEAN Community during the period of 2005-2010. At the meeting of the ASEAN ministers of economy in 2006, it was decided to schedule these programs by 5 years ahead; the decision was approved at the ASEAN top-level meeting in January 2007. At the same time, they adopted the “Kuala Lumpur Declaration” for the ASEAN Charter. At the 13th top level meeting in November 2007, which was 40th anniversary of ASEAN, they signed the blue print of ASEAN Economy Community which showed the road map of establishing ASEAN Community by 2015. (Hirakawa 2008b)

Koizumi announced the Tokyo Declaration at the Japan-ASEAN special top-level meeting which was held in Tokyo in December 2003 where he expressed “to give full support to the execution of the Declaration of ASEAN

Concord II which led to establishing the ASEAN Community” and “to want establishing East Asian Community” (translation in MOFA’ s HP) It was strange that neither the leaders of China nor Korea participated in this meeting.

Regarding the opening of the EAS(East Asia Summit) which was approved by the meeting of ASEAN+3 in 2004, Japan proposed the attendance of the United States as an observer, but could not obtain agreement due to the careful attitude of ASEAN and China. Japan made an effort to “opened framework” of the meeting. Regarding the first East Asian Top Level Meeting which was held in December 2005, Japanese newspapers unanimously used as a head line “struggle for taking initiative between Japan and China” . The Asahi Shinbun (December 4, 2005) quoted “struggle for the initiative between Japan and China” . The Nikkei Shinbun (evening edition of December 8) quoted “competition among China, Japan and the United States for the taking the initiative for East Asia Community” . Mainichi Shinbun (December 14) said “Japan and China contend to take the initiative of “East Asia Community” . The position of Japan for the East Asia Community is the concern for the United States and the restraint of China. Japan thought, otherwise, China would take an initiative. There lies, however, the fundamental subject of Japanese foreign policy after the War. How, Japan, which is relying on the United States, is to be concerned with ASEAN and China which were gradually getting their autonomy.

Today, the change of world structure is accelerating through the world financial crisis which started from the United States and its influence on the actual economy. The prosperity of Japan is directly connected with the prosperity and the peace of the East Asia region. Today’ s perception requires that national development is in the framework of borderless prosperity.

## Conclusion:

### -Japanese new horizon of East Asian idea-

The Japanese idea of East Asia was made up together with Japanese modernization, and was described in various style at each stage of progress. The perception toward the outside world in the Meiji era began to change in the middle of 1980s. Japanese consciousness to resist Western Powers by the solidarity and alliance with Asian people who exist under or in fear of Western control, began to change to the theory of liberation of Asia under the leadership of Japan with the increased the national power and the establishment of the Tenno system. Japan completed their colonization of Chosun Peninsula by the Japan-Korea Annexation in 1910 which followed after the wars between Sino-Japan and Russo-Japan by which Japan controlled the Peninsula. In 19th century, the year of 1885 seemed to be a symbol of the

turning point. In 1885, Tokichi Tarui explained the consolidation of Japan and Korea on equal basis in his “Daito Gappeiron” (the Report on the consolidation in the Greater Asia). On the other hand, Yukichi Hukuzawa expressed “De-Asia(getting out of Asia)” after the defeat of the group who promoted the liberazation of people.

In 20th century, the decade 1910-1920 became another turning point before the War. Asian-ism began to be monopolized by the right wing faction. The ideology of the invasion of China was accepted as proclaiming the liberation of Asia and the historical mission of the Japanese race. The extravagance of Japanese race which has the Tenno System seemed to have been pushed forward. The extreme outcome was the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The victory of Germany in the first battle at the World War II led Japan to the Tripartite Pact (Three-Power Pact) among Germany, Italy and Japan. With this alliance, Japan decided to wage the “Greater East Asia” war against South East Asia which possessed vast natural resources. Contrary to the words and idea “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” , it was the Japanese control by militarism that prevailed. Such idea functioned only for the rationalization of the invasion which trascended the feeling of the individual Japanese.

After the War, the East Asian policy of a defeated Japan started from the reparation as was the norm for post-war conduct. The reparation was very generous under the background of the cold war between the East and the West, and it was executed with the end in view to promote Japanese development. In its position toward the Organization of Asian Economic Cooperation in ECAFE, Japan made known as its prime objective the protection of Japanese agriculture, and this has continued even to the present time.

The signal for the resurgence of Japanese Asian policy after the War would be the discussion of the Pacific and Asia community at the latter part of 1960s. Such discussion and plans arose from the increase of Japanese economic power and the expectation of the growth of the East Asian countries in the pan-pacific trade. In the period of 1970-1990, especially after the 1980s, the integration of the pan pacific economy developed under the circumstance of the return of the socialist countries to the international world, and Japan supported the formation of the frame work of such cooperation. APEC is positioned on the top.

However, these renewed efforts towards regional cooperation by the Asian monetary crisis of 1997 which actualized the uncertainty of the globalization by the United States.

The plan of East Asia community, which Koizumi proposed in this century, used the words at the beginning “East Asia Community” , but actually he only



meant to cooperate further. But it became the argument of “Community” by the East Asia Community plan in which ASEAN took a leading part and became the common goal of the region where there was a strong cooperation. But it can be said that Japan made a proposal to keep China from taking the initiative to organize the Community, given that the movement of the community was expanding in East Asia.

There are some people who view with caution the recent vogue about the East Asia Community idea, saying that it make them recall the Greater East Asia Coprosperity system. Other people say we have to strengthen the US-Japan cooperation and security because of the threat of Chinese Hegemony. However, the present Japanese East Asian policy has changed greatly compared with the past as explained in this report, and summarized as follows:

1. The East Asian Policy before the War, namely the Asian-ism which led to the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity , was certainly arrogant but it gave the Japanese a sense of superiority when Japan succeeded in its modernization and in increasing its national standing in the world. It allowed Japan, to be the leader of Asia, and to confront the European Powers and their tendency to despise the Asia.
2. When the reparation after the War became the issue, the framework which utilized the East Asia for the reconstruction of Japan was adopted. When the East Asian countries and regions made progresses in the framework of Asian Pacific, Japan had some restriction in trying to get the leadership.
3. The proposal of East Asia Community Plan was not monopolized by Japan. Japan proposed it, as the countermeasure to China who developed and increased their national power, so as not to miss the East Asia Community Plan of ASEAN and China.

What I think noteworthy in the East Asia Community Plan is that the present is not the repetition of history. Firstly the economic power of Japan in the region became relatively weak in this half century. In 1980s Japan' s GDP exceeded more than 80% that of East Asia. But today, Japan exceeded only by over 50%. It was China who increased GDP rapidly instead of Japan. Neither NIES nor ASEAN did decrease their growth rate.

Secondly the strengthening of regional cooperation became the subject of that period by the reason that the risk enlarged in accordance with the progress of globalization.

At the same time, the development of each countries was attained first in the borderless framework. It is necessary to have the viewpoint of regional interests not national interests.

Japan has become the biggest economic power in East Asia even now,

but our development is relying heavily on the growth of Asia. In the light of increasing uncertainty in the period of changing international political and economic structure, the Japanese function to be attained is to establish the framework which integrate the prosperity of Japan and the region “over the frame of national border” . It must be the road to achieve the Japanese leadership that we promote the idea of East Asia Community on the basis of the region. (Edited by Hirakawa • Kobayashi 2009)

The omnipotent market-ism of the United States based on the new liberalized globalization caused the world financial crisis which started from America and we are now in the situation which demand the new world economic order. If Japan can work out the plan which would contribute to the regional prosperity and stability, the East Asia Community Plan of Japan must be accepted as the public common idea of the region.

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発表 2

# East Asian Regionalism and Korea' s Perspective — Korean Regionalism —

by **Sohn Yul** (Professor, Graduate School of International Studies,  
Yonsei University)

## Introduction

It has been proposed that East Asia should be integrated as a community. But it is not always necessary to do so. Regionalism is a megatrend of the time, but interests of each member of East Asia are different. As such these are relevant questions regarding regionalism: what for ? which area ? how to institutionalize/to what extent ? to who are the members ?

While Europe and America have been integrated, there is a strong clamor for Asian integration. What is important is the constituent work such as identifying and deciding who would be the members of the community and determining the frequency of meetings, etc. Regional concept, depending on a constituent of identity, may become advantageous or disadvantageous, and convenient or inconvenient for each member. What is lacking in East Asia are common values which are profitable to all the members.

This can be achieved only when membership identity is acceptable to each member and a balancing of interests is maintained. Accordingly, the region is not clearly limited and will be decided by a fruitful exchange of ideas.

The region of East Asia is composed of countries with diverse interests. Leading countries are groping for each regional concept and are competing with each other. China is trying to pull ASEAN to their side. On the other hand, they connect with Central Asia through SCO ( Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Japan is moving toward East Asia Community which consists of ASEAN + 3 and Australia, New Zealand and India. America is trying to check the movement of regionalism only by East Asian countries through

an enlargement of the sphere of influence of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). Korea is not an exception: it has been promoting the idea of regional community in North East Asia.

It is important to note that there are selfish regional strategies behind these concepts

of regionalism. The proponents would like their respective regional communities to be a center by which they can maximize their interest. It is the reality of East Asia that regional concept is competing politically while concealing their different intention. It is nearly "a struggle for the initiative" to decide on the characteristics of individual concepts rather than on international "discussion for friendship" . China is trying to establish a region excluding America, and Japan is trying to promote another theory of community positively for Japanese own interest not incorporating the region under the Chinese leadership. America is also participating in order to achieve their own interest. The North East Asian theory by Korea, on the other hand, is also a selfish concept which tries to settle the issue of the Korean peninsula at a regional level.

Under the competition of different regional concepts, if one country forces its own interest or concept of their region by using physical power, that region becomes "an empire" headed by the superior country. After the attack on Iraq, the order of the Middle East, which America thought could not get the spontaneous or semi-spontaneous consent of the members of the region, resulted in America being accused of establishing an empire. Going back to the pre-war period, the Japanese East Asia community or the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was also criticized as an empire wearing the mask of community.

The present competition in East Asia looks for the concept of regionalism that would win the heart of all countries in the region. According to Joseph Nye, this is the competition of soft-power. It is the power of touching hearts and a kind of appealing power which makes opponents change their selfish interests that we want. If the concept is correct, it would be the key to the success of how the regional concept of a certain area can appeal to all the members of the region. The soft power approach exceeds the so-called hard power, like military power and economic power of the nation proposing the regional concept.

What I would like to say is that we have to start from the understanding of the process of international politics in dealing with competing concepts of regionalism since the regional concept of East Asia at present comes from different national interests. As mentioned above, a regional community is not a given but has to be created from the competition of creation and wisdom among the different groups or nations. To be more concrete, in the theory that

one area shall be established as one region requires a common DNA which integrates member countries into the regional community to compose one political unit.. In other words, what is common or something special which should be possessed commonly by each regional member will be necessary. An appeal of regional concept needs attractive DNA starting from creation. It is a specific value and geo-political and economical consideration and idea.

If the competition of the regional concept is one of creation - an attractive creation of regional DNA -, then it is required to cooperate and integrate in order to bring attractive DNA to a conclusion which can be owned jointly and commonly by the members of the community. Is this possible ? Would the regional concept proposed by one faction be attractive to other faction or factions? How to compose the "Seoul Concensus" as an attractive program for the pursuit of regionalism ?

## Change of order in East Asia

Regionalism in East Asia has been changing and therefore has become more diverse and complicated along with the passage of time. The changes affecting the region included extricating from the cold war, the onset of globalization, and the rise of an information-oriented society - all at the beginning of the 20th century, under the double hegemony of England and America, through the hegemony of Japan from 1931 to 1945, and again through the double hegemony of the Cold War after 1945. East Asia held diversified factors for discord which derived from the imperfect shift to the modern period. South Korea and North Korea, China and Taiwan, they were competing for building modern nations. Territorial issues like Dokdo (Takeshima) and historical issues among Japan, China and Korea are the dispute relating to national identity. North Korea which is promoting its development of nuclear capability collided head-on with America. The more important thing is that East Asia holds the balance of power in the traditional conflict in the context of the modern period.

When East Asia shifted to the modern society, the dynamism of conflict, cooperation and modern competition in the process of solving problems is the most important factor which regulates international relations in East Asia in the 21st century.

America is the most important country when we consider the regional order of East Asia. There was the time, after the Cold War, when a multi-polarized world was the objective, but in the end the world was reorganized as a single-polarized world centering on America. American military cost is bigger than the total cost of 15 to 20 countries that followed America. America is in the overwhelmingly superior position in the field of nuclear and conventional weapons as well as an advanced military power. The American economy stayed

double that of the Japanese economy which is ranked second in the world economy. In the case of technical development, American R&D cost, which is said to be the most important factor of national power in the 21st century, is almost equal to the total R&D cost of the next seven countries after America.

A stable unipolar world led by America will be difficult to maintain. There are now various problematic symptoms, which we can grasp from two directions. One is so-called "global imbalance" which came from two red figures (financial red figures and red figures of the balance of ordinary account). The American current account deficit became bigger (in 2005, 6.4% of GDP), meanwhile the current account surplus in East Asia showed substantial big figures. The US Dollar became weaker as a result of global imbalance, and led to the world recession, such as the collapse of the bubble economy starting from America and the stagnation of consumption. This means that the position of America which has been dominating the financial world became unstable.

Next is the rise of rival countries, namely the BRICs, especially the case of China is typical. China is keeping high-growth after the economic reforms and the opening of China to world trade. As a result China rose to the sixth position in the world recording more than 9% annual growth rate of GDP growth during the last 20 years. As to foreign trade, they are now the fourth largest exporter and the third largest importer, and at the top in the inward FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). They already exceeded Japan when we evaluate GDP by the standard of PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) and their position is now next to America. According to a forecast reported by Goldman Sachs China would exceed Japan in 2018 and would become the biggest country in terms of world economics around the year 2050.

At present, the Asian production network is expanding, and China, at the center of this network is in the process of changing the network from being the "factories in the world" to the "markets of the world".

Since one fifth of the world population is Chinese, it is said that 200 million people which is 15% of the Chinese population has become middle-class whose annual income exceeds 100 million won (equivalent to 10 million Japanese Yen). In other words, China will appear as a huge economic sphere in both consumption and production by the emergence of the middle-class which has a large purchasing power.

The economic power is evident also in the military power. This is because the increase of expenditures in the national finance due to the economic growth has also led to increase in expenditures for national defence. The cost of the national defence in China follows that of America and Russia. It is the biggest figure in Asia. China keeps on developing and acquiring advanced technologies.

Such a pace of change is seen as the status quo of the power transition, that is relative decline of America and rise of China. The US Department of Defence and the hawks in America have been advocating containment to cope with the threat posed by the Chinese challenge. China, on the other hand, has recognized such circumstances. Peaceful rise of a nation makes surrounding nations nervous and uneasy and cause a war. However, such a war should be started with an awareness of the fact that emerging nations have never been victorious. Hence, China should be aware of the precedents of emerging nations in the past.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China, with “Chinese great restoration” as a national strategy, has brought about the economic achievement and awakened the “(lull) breathing society” to increase its GDP in 2020 to four times that of 2000. In order to achieve the strategy focusing on the economy, China has advocated the theory of a peaceful emergence as its external strategy.

American intention toward China, with its theory of peaceful development is reflected in their changing view that they regard China as a strong partner rather than a rival. Such viewpoint will be maintained for the time being. The theory “responsible and understandable parties concerned” proposed by Zoelick, the Vice Secretary of the States in 2005, is suggesting such change in the American position.

In this theory, China is portrayed as an understandable party concerned in the world political order controlled and managed by America, and it means their participation and cooperation for the execution of responsible functions. At the same time, America takes a strategy of dispersion of the risk toward China so that the position of hegemony of America is not threatened. Namely, when China shows signs of changing the status quo without fulfilling their responsibility, America should prepare for military intervention. It means also taking measures to increase the effectiveness of participation of its allies. The core of such measures is the military alliance between America and Japan. America tries to keep military and diplomatic relations more closely with Japan, as an allied power, to enlarge the space of action, and to fulfill the check by the allies.

Furthermore, America, utilizing the alliance with Australia, India and Korea, is trying to fulfill their multi-layer participation through the cooperation among those countries (so-called the democratic alliances).

It is possible for China, in keeping the cooperation between America and China, to develop peacefully if such risky factors as the nuclear issue of North Korea and issue of Taiwan would be well-controlled. It means the real power transition. The power transition between America and China does not mean, however, the change of the hegemony of China for America. China cannot



take the initiative of the world order as America has been doing, even if China economically exceeds Japan and catches up to the level of America in 2020, maintaining the "society of temporary lull" totally. Even if the GDP of China reaches the same level of America, when we judge the overall national power by technical, intellectual, military power and other soft power, sharing the power with America would be the maximum limit for China which develops peacefully.

Peaceful development of China and the peace between America and China mean both countries grow separately without any wars. It does not mean there is no competition nor dispute in the region. In other words, the peace between America and China does not mean the end of competition, confrontation or dispute among the countries in the East Asia region. The relation between China and Japan is typical. Along with the power transition of China and Japan, both countries entered into the competitive status locally. Such cases as Japan opposes Chinese proposals and China opposes Japanese proposals are increasing. China, which wants peaceful development, fell into the competitive posture with Japan, and took relatively more severe behavior than Japan received from America. Japan corresponds to China more sensitively than America's feeling of uneasiness on the security towards the Chinese power transition. This is because Japan has a feeling of decline relative to the Chinese development. Japan fell into a period of long recession by the financial tremors which started from financial insecurity in the 1990s. Japan experienced the so-called "lost decade" and the Japanese model of high economic growth at certain period lost momentum and prestige. Coalition regimes were arrived at, but the political and diplomatic leadership was weakened. As a result, Japan recorded "zero-growth" in the 1990s. National financial condition was the worst among OECD countries and recorded the red figure of more than 30trillion yen a year. Such a big red figure was offset luckily by the financial assets of the people (Japanese). The affirmative side is the gradual recovery of the economy starting from 2002. GDP is growing by around 3% and the unemployment rate is decreasing and the financial insecurity was solved through the structural adjustment of the banking sectors. Among the adjustments of the enterprise sectors, the lead of the IT revolution in the field of digital home appliances became the power of recovery. However, Japan held the factors which lead to the limit of growth, that is the decrease of the population and the decline of the social vitalities. In other words, Japan had to overcome various difficulties to achieve a lasting growth.

Japan, as the leader of East Asia, faces the security dilemma which comes from Chinese emergence, and the position of hegemony in the region is being waved.

Japanese countermeasure is the military alliance with America. Starting

from the US-Japan Joint Statement for Security in 1996, the Guideline for US-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997, the General Principle for New Security Treaty in 2004, and the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee in 2005, Japan pointed out clearly the military power which restrains China on the axis of the US-Japan alliance. Japan, furthermore, is looking for democratic alliances with Australia and India.

In the stream of power transition by the Chinese emergence, East Asian countries handle international politics through competition and cooperation among the big powers. On one hand, they are going for economic integration.

In the 1950' s, the Japanese economy entered into a time of high growth, and in 1960-70' s the new industrial nations like Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong emerged and in 1970-80' s other Asian countries grew and China made a record high growth after the end of the 1980' s. The East Asian region has functioned as the engine of the growth of the world economy. East Asian nations built up export-oriented economic systems and recorded high growths through trade and direct investment.

The point to be noted here is the high reliance on trade and investment within the region. Especially, the trade within the region was activated and the amount of exports within the region rose to 9.6 times during 10 years after 1995. This figure is almost double that of EU and NAFTA which were 5.5 times and 5.2 times, respectively for the same period. The weight of export amount within the region is 50% on the 2004 standard and this figure is getting closer to the level of EU which is 67.2% and of NAFTA which is 55.9%.

During the period 1980-1990' s, East Asia expanded rapidly in the inflow, within the region of direct investment. Though such expansion declined temporally by the currency crisis in 1997 and the collapse of the IT bubble in 2000, direct investment generally increased thereafter. The direct investment to East Asia became 20% of the world and 50% of this figure was absorbed by China at the 2004 standard level.

The balance of the direct investment of East Asia within the region in 2003 was \$1.0403 trillion which was 6.9 times the '90s level and this figure was 3.5 times that of America and 4.4 times of the world.

There was the change of the system behind such an expansion of the regional investment and trade, namely a diffusion of the network for regional productions.

The network of regional production had been operated through investment and trade as the basis of the structure of regional specialization. The production network of Japan after 1980' s coexisted with the business network of the ethnic Chinese people which diffused rapidly after 1990' s together with the economic growth of China. In addition to this, American global production network flew into hard times again after the Asian financial

crisis in 1997, and became multi-layered.

The regional exchange was deepened in the social and cultural fields related to an economy. Exchange of culture and knowledge and shift of population resulted in parting from the situation of exchange which was led by America. On the other hand, the emergence of the Korean way is a good example that the position of the industrial culture of East Asia rose and moved to the direction not dependent on American industrial culture.. Diffusion of the cultural network of East Asia is mediated by the internet, so further development hereafter should be watched.

Integration of an economy led by the market and deepening social and cultural exchange has the same meaning as the paradigm that regionalization of East Asia is the trend of the time and has brought a new meaning for the direction of competition and cooperation among the leading nations. In the stream of power transition, every nation is trying to keep or stop the relative gap of national power. They are trying to integrate in the sense that the integration of economic development links to the vitality of regional economy, but the tendency which they like to lead their regionalism to the direction of their own interests became conspicuous. China, as the leader of integration, is trying to pull East Asian countries toward it. It is understood that as a strategy they will compete with America by taking the initiative in the regional integration. Japan is also trying to take the initiative over China in the regional integration, on the one axis of US-Japan Alliance and on the other axis, East Asia community which Japan is proposing. America is trying to check the order of East Asia by the Chinese initiative by strengthening APEC or through a support from the East Asian community which Japan proposes. ASEAN is trying to carry out an important function of promoting regional integration in the face of the rivalry between China and Japan. Korea also has been looking at the community of North-East Asia which connects China, Japan and Korea.

Amid the struggle for hegemony, East Asian countries have been competing radically for the purpose of national interests. Regionalism in this region appeared to be a competition of the regional concept which speaks for their national interests, rather than seeking for regional interests through the transfer and joint ownership of sovereignty. In East Asia, the real intention to integrate the region is different from the European regional concept.

## An Appeal for Consensus

There are various ways for accomplishing cooperation and the integration of each country of East Asia. Firstly, the composition to cooperate with each other is initiated by the strong power of a nation with hegemony. America, after the Cold War, showed their strong power in East Asia and gave a big

influence to the composition of multinational cooperation. They led APEC and strengthened the existing alliances between two countries checking positively the appearance of the East Asian communities which excluded America. It is the new movement that, for the purpose of controlling the war against terrorism and Chinese emergence, America strengthened its cooperation with Japan, India and Australia. But there is a certain limit to lead cooperations by coercive physical power. This is because when the power of the country of hegemony is weakened and alliances for anti-hegemony are formed, it becomes difficult to set up an effective regional cooperation.

The traditional order in East Asia had been influenced before by the hegemony of China. China has a strong military and economic power. It is true that regional cooperation becomes possible by effectively controlling the military challenges of the surrounding population and forcing these people to obedience in keeping the tribute system based on their rich economic power. However, when the power of China weakened, the surrounding people always invaded China to try to get huge economic resources. At present, so-called "the fourth emergence of China" is a topic of conversation in China on the emergence of China in the 21st century. The emergence of China which affects East Asia this time is the fourth in the history in China, which follow 晋 (chin) • 漢 (han), 唐 (Tang) / 宋 (sung), and 明 (ming). When we look at a history of traditional order in a region, we can easily understand that there is a limit to the order of regional cooperation by emerging hegemony. When the power of the country of hegemony weakens, surrounding countries secede from the cooperation and become threats to China. This suggests that any country cannot get a lasting regional cooperation without the cooperation of the surrounding countries.

Factor other than regional cooperation based solely on power is common interests. Regional cooperation becomes possible when various countries find common interests and form a framework of systematic and lasting cooperation. It is true that the base of regional cooperation will be enlarged by mutual economic interests when the integration under the capitalism is developing on the global scale. Even if historical or territorial controversies happen among Korea, China and Japan, it will be impossible to part completely from the relationship of cooperation unless economic discontinuity is decided. This is because deepening of economic interdependence functions as a safety valve for preventing deterioration of relations. Market peace is one. It is necessary to have systematic measures which can keep a balance of interests of countries of the region. The reason why it is difficult to institutionalize economic systems like FTA (Free Trade Agreement) among Korea, China and Japan, is the high possibility that the balance of interests of each country will be destroyed by various reasons. In order to realize the system of joint

ownership of interests, other regional factors which are more powerful than the existence of power of hegemony and equalization of profit are required. Regional factors mentioned above are understood as soft power.

The term "Soft power" was coined and used by Dr. Joseph Nye, in international relations, in 1989. Nye classified this term into three aspects: 1) compulsion by a whip, 2) inducement by candy and 3) pulling near as the other party wants. He designated the whip as military, candy as economic power, and cultural ideas and diplomatic techniques. He explained that this separate designations is a way of using power. Hard power is an ability to pull compulsorily near to what you want contrary to what the other party wants (which is not to pull). Soft power is an ability to induce others to what you want.

Soft power is understood as an appeal, namely a function of "a power which touches the heart" . An appeal is an ability which persuades the other as a wisdom stimulating their emotion and utilize wisely the object of appeal. In this sense, in order to lead the people of the region as one unit to the cooperation among the members, it is necessary to have a soft power or an appeal which touches their heart or lead to spontaneous cooperation. It is an ability which discovers or creates an appealing factor. If a certain country intends to form a region which its people would want, it is necessary to bring up to people any appealing and special regional aspects.

In the present East Asia situation, international competition due to power shift are still continuing and these competitions form a competitive aspect of the region. Competition appears to be a competition of an appeal among nations which exceeds political and military hegemony and economic interests. An issue of competition is to give regional appealing features. Not only giving an appealing point itself, but it is equally important to have an appealing sender or presenter of the idea or concept.. This is so because it is very hard to effectively use soft power if there is no appealing presenter even though the program itself is attractive. For example, regional cooperation is achieved only when an appealing point is adequately presented, of course more so if soft power presented with the awareness of hard power - military and economic power.

I hereby express an appealing program as a "consensus" . Beijing consensus is one of the expressions by which Chinese appealing points are presented. This is the expression by which the model of China's development is packaged attractively as a counter to the Washington concept. As such, the word 'concept' was derived from Washington's concept. In 1990, John Williamson called the reform program of the liberalized economy 'Washington consensus' , which proposed the policy for Central and South America, by three organizations based in Washington (World Bank, IMF and

the Department of Treasury). This is also a policy manifesto which America gives the third world and, at the same time, is the ideal program which show a future which he will walk. Washington consensus diffuses market economy and democracy in the shift of the system, which contains the idea and identity which America wants. Once this is recognized as the result of an intellectual convergence, it is accepted as more attractive, but if it is recognized, on the contrary, as a specific policy which meets American interests, then an appeal will be reduced by half. In case of the latter, this word was used scornfully in the Central and South America.

As Washington consensus is the American program which has physical power and intellectual appeal, each country can propose their own consensus. Beijing consensus, as the Chinese development program, seems strategic which seeks to appeal not only to East Asia but also to the developing countries of the third world. Japan, on the other hand, wrapping their theory of "East Asia community" attractively, seems to try to get an initiative of cooperation and integration within the limit of the region. This can be called as "Tokyo consensus" . If Korea tries to lead East Asia to unite, then it is "Seoul consensus" . In other words, the space East Asia is the battlefield of consensus, namely the aspect of competition of appealing which lead the consensus of East Asia to their own program of the region. In order to deeply understand the international politics of East Asia, we have to grasp such political dynamics. This work would contain the proposal of the programs of policy and ideas of the main countries which connect regional space of East Asia, and the evaluation and analysis of the dynamics of competition. This is the work which would clarify the composition and competition of the different consensus. It is necessary for Korea to propose an attractive program, that is the "Seoul consensus" , searching for the attractive factors which connect East Asia in the field of economics and culture, after grasping the strategic intention, process of promotion, appealing point of logical connection of the consensus of the main countries of East Asia like China, Japan, Korea, and North Korea.

# Japanese View of China

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## Preface

When we study the future of North-East Asia, how they recognize each other, above all, is important. Diplomatic policies are influenced by public sentiment and public diplomacy is regarded as important in policy making. Those factors are supporting the importance of this concept.

When we narrow down to the relation between Japan and China, we cannot say the sentiments of both countries are in good condition. According to the “public-opinion poll on diplomacy” in 2008, the issue “feel familiarity to China” was got a rating of 31.8% which was the lowest in the past. In China too, the sentiment to Japan, in general, is not so good. It is said, however, that the rating of “feel familiarity to Japan” increased last year. Usually, the figures of sentiments of both countries synchronize, but they retrograded this year. It is a new phenomenon and worth being noticed.

In this report, I like to aim at summarizing the Japanese view of China historically, and the result of our survey of the last 30 years and the situation last year.

## The view of China by the modern Japan

Since the Edo period, Japanese have respected China, but gradually began to feel strongly self-reliant from China. In the Meiji era, of course, there was a conversation by writing between Huang Tsun-hsien and Haruna Ookouchi at the Chinese Legation in Japan and according to the record, this exchange had its basis on Chinese poetry and Confucianism. It is understood that this exchange was realized on the basis of such concepts for “a man of integrity” as Chinese studies like “Four Books and Five Classics” (四書五經) have described. Since the last stage of Edo to Meiji era, there were arguments among Japanese cultured persons who are conscious of self-reliance from China and we observe

that an original form of the new international perception was being brought up. International perception means the world is divided into three, that is, the East (Asia) / Japan /the West. The third, Japanese/Western/Chinese, I think enters into not only a field of study but a daily life too..

In the field of diplomatic history which I am specialized in, the Treaty of Ganghwa was the first agreement (it was actually a 'treaty' but the difference between treaty and agreement should be discussed). It is said that Japan described China as an uncivilized country (in the sense of the modern) thinking of the powers in Europe and America in order to aim at the revision of an unequal treaty. In other words, when Japan revised an agreement, and if England and other countries admitted the revision they hesitate to admit China also; Japan had to emphasize the difference between Japan and China. For example, this is clearly shown in the reasoning for dispatching troops to Taiwan. There is a belief (among Japan) that Japan understood international law while China could not understand world common sense.

Such belief was strengthened and affirmed by the Japanese victory at the First Sino-Japanese War. For example, Munemitsu Mutu justified the War saying that; "In China, they keep old customs persistently and have no intention to change their old system in accordance with the change of the world. Two countries are separated only by the sea, and one represents European culture and the other shows a strange aspect that keeps East Asiatic customs. Japanese scholars in Chinese Classics and Confucianism once admired China saying that it is the center of the world (Sino-centrism) or great country, which relative to our country humiliate ourselves. But now they abuse China as a very conservative, stupid, and stubborn country. On the other hand, they, scorned Japan as one small island which imitate European culture superficially. The feeling of both countries could not be admitted by each other and a big controversy shall arise some day." (Munemitsu Mutu "Kan-Kan-Roku" 1896)

Japanese view of China, as mentioned above, is related to the thinking that the world is divided into three, the West (Western civilization)/Japan/the East (traditional).

Modern Japan drew their perception of the world, with the West as the goal to be reached and the East (represented by China) to be denied.

After the 1930s, it was shown that Japan had often denied the simple imitation of the West and tried to bring itself near Asian side in the midst of the era of Asian-ism.

However, even in war-time, Japan continued to regard "science" and "objectivity" as important, which were the basis of the Western civilization, and understood that only Japan had the "Japanese spirit" that could absorb, assimilate and raise the "universal" civilization. China, on the contrary, could absorb and assimilate it only superficially. It seemed they thought, although



only Japanese could hold the “Japanese spirit”; the people of the colonies or the coprosperity spheres could only “come near” to it. (Of course, it is a different story whether the people of the colonies wanted to or not.) In the era of Asia-ism, the Japanese feeling of being superior to Asia increased. In this sense, the way of thinking which divided the world into three was maintained in war-time.

## Japanese View of China, early times after the War

August 15, 1945 was the watershed of the Japanese perception of history. It was considered as a dividing point of a period like a border between the past and the present. But, how did it influence the Japanese view of China? Could China feel a reality about “the country of victory” immediately? According to newspapers in Shanghai, soon after the war, the living standard of the Japanese who were called together in Hongkou (虹口) was very often reported rich, as compared with those of the people of the victorious China. In Japan too, the historical perception like ‘the people of the third country’ was already discussed. Wataru Kaji questioned the importance of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (七七一盧溝橋事件) and the historical perception saying “generally speaking, Japanese, especially conservative people have a vivid recollection of B29 when they hear the words Pearl Harbour, but it is hard for them to understand quickly when they hear the words Marco Polo Bridge Incident.” ( “Memorial day of July 7” by Wataru Kaji, “News Papers for Chinese students in Japan” No. 33, July 1, 1949) When we read “Chang Kai-Shek Diaries” , there were a lot of scenes that he deplored saying that a lot of Japanese even after the War were still arrogant toward Chinese, and he confessed afterwards that his own policy of “rewarding hatred with virtue (以德報怨)” was mistaken. This pointed out the tendency of Japanese society that Japanese are aware of the defeat by America but are not aware of the defeat by China.

On the other hand, in the early times after the War, the student movements of the left wing were active and sympathetic towards the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the anti-war movement toward the Vietnam War spread enthusiastically. The movement of friendship between Japan and China also developed. However, how did this movement overcome the Japanese view of China after the Meiji era and the perception which divided the world into three? There remained a room of doubt.

In 1972 with the normalization of diplomatic relation between Japan and China was materialized, favorable feelings toward China were very high, though we could not say that there were no Taiwan supporters. About 80% of the people might feel an affinity toward China. In the 1980s, there happened the issues of the textbook and the issue of the visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,

but Japanese sentiment toward China was good which we, at present, cannot imagine. Japan, at that time, was overwhelmingly superior to China in the field of economy and others.

## After the Tiananmen Square Protest


That day (2009/2/21), a graph on 'feelings for China' by Japan was shown

This table was arranged from the data which a Japanese media investigated periodically, and it does not show simply 'like' or 'dislike' , but show 'like' or 'dislike' comparing with the other countries. Because of this, it has special features that tendencies of emotion are clearly shown, but there is a question whether the figures themselves show favourability directly or not. I think, however, it is useful in the sense that the change or tendency of emotion is shown.

When we study several opinion researches including this table, we come to know that it was the Tiananmen Square Protest of 1989 that had a decisive impact on the Japanese View of China which was seen in so-called "honeymoon" in the 1980s. Because of this, favorable opinion of China decreased drastically, and the situation of the '80s has not recovered until now. It tells the impact of this Protest. In the early 1990s, Japan lifted the economic sanctions taking the initiative vis-a-vis the Western countries. It was also the Chinese policy which was written in Ten issues in his personal history as a diplomat by Qian Qichen. Even after the visit to China by His Majesty the Emperor in the beginning of 1990s, Japanese favorable opinion of China did not return to the situation before the Tiananmen Square Protest and 'like' and 'dislike' are nearly equal. The Tiananmen Square Protest re-activated the Japanese view which was popular since the Meiji era that China was uncivilized. It is said that this view gave a big impact also on the friendly movement which supported the Communist Party of China. We can say that such change of Japanese view on China of the Tianamen Square Protest is not the same in Korea.

It was the missile firing test to Taiwan straits in March, 1996 that change d to the situation that 'like' and 'dislike' are almost equal. It was a sufficient impact which gave an impression to Japan that China was a threat in the sense of military and security. Since then, 'like' and 'dislike' were not equal and the situation which 'dislike' exceeded 'like' has been brought up.

It is unnecessary to say about the situation this century. Every time when such news, starting from the case at the Consulate-General of Japan in Shenyang, the event of the soccer game and the anti-Japanese demonstrations were reported, the mutual perception of both countries became worse. The issue of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine was raised as an



important issue, but if the Japanese prime minister did not visit Yasukuni, would Japanese image of China change for the better? The answer was negative. Japan realized once again that China is uncivilized based on the threat from the Tiananmen Square Protest and the missile firing test. It is possible to say that Japanese suspicion of China increased by a series of such accidents or events.

However, it should be noted that we have to emphasize more seriously about the past method which divided the world into three. As a result of the economic growth of China, it became a significant political and military big power, and achieves the status of big economic power in the world. In such situation, it became difficult for Japan to maintain its stance of striving towards the West and denying the East (Orient). Japan also cannot maintain its identity without purposely emphasizing it. Such phenomena which we can easily rationalize are increasing. Japanese change in perception of China can be said to be a Japanese identity itself, which means the existence of China was strong ground for Japanese self-perception. It is a subject for Japan how to accept

China which is a big power, and is developing into a global power.

## The recent situation

At the stage where Chinese power has become equal or bigger than Japan politically, militarily and economically, how is the Japanese perception toward China? As mentioned above, the figure "affinity to China" in "the public survey about foreign policy" in 2008 showed 31.8% which was the lowest in the past. On the other hand, the figure in China was a marked contrast. It was distinctive in the survey this year that the view by Japanese female was quite unfavourable. (68.6% unfavourable, 29.5% favourable) (toward Korea, 57.1% of them feel favourable) It was also distinctive that more than 40% of those in their 20s feel favourable. It is easily analogous that China is to be recognized as a possible "threat to daily life" in terms of food or sanitation.

This threat cannot be resolved at top-level meetings nor be filled up by emphasizing "the Record of Three Kingdoms" (三国志) or Chinese history. It is also the problem of the Chinese themselves. In China, they cannot imagine Japan to be "a threat to daily life". In this sense, the situation is not constructive.

How do Chinese view Japan? Due to stressing by the media as a result of

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
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JAPAN

KOREA



the visit to Japan by Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, or due to a high evaluation of Japanese (rescue) activity at the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, it is said that Chinese view of Japan has improved very much. According to the survey report by the income, the higher the income, the more favourable to Japan.

It can be analogized that the economical growth of China makes Chinese people feel favourable to Japan, but the result is unknown. As mentioned above, in 2008 new tendency, which was not seen in the past, appeared in both countries.

## Conclusion

Japanese view of China which was based on the perception that the world is divided into three, the Orient/Japan/the West, seemed to have been succeeded by another perception after the War, but due to the fact China was getting stronger in every field, Japan internally showed a denial reaction. It was the argument of the threat of China. Today, negative opinion against China are predominant as seen in such reports as the Olympics and the issue of Tibet, but I think the existence of China itself tend to be accepted regardless of like or dislike. Distrust of China itself did not come from political or historical perception, which shows that China started to be recognized gradually as a threat to daily life itself. The relation between two countries has been getting closer such that there could be no Japanese daily life without an economic relation with China, but it is hard to say that the tendency, wherein the Japanese regard the existence of China as important as a partner, is predominant at the level of public sentiment (though it is often seen on the political and diplomatic levels).

In China, their sentiment toward Japan changed for the better as compared with the past. This favorable sentiment was helped by the visit to Japan by the General Secretary or by the leading media, though fundamental issues like perception of history remained. Such change in China did not have much effect in Japan. Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, tried to express his thanks to Japanese people at the G8 Summit at Lake Toya inviting the rescue team that went to the Sichuan earthquake, but the Japanese media did not report it. It may be one of public diplomacy, but the problem seems to await solution. We cannot overlook mutual impressions differentiated by gender, generation, locality, and income. For example, Japanese women do not feel favorable to China, or Chinese rich people feel favorable to Japan.

Recently a big wave of sentiments toward China, as was seen under the Koizumi regime, was not seen, and public sentiments did not respond

sensitively to Chinese information. It means, we can say, it became difficult to change for the better. They said it was 'cold in politics and hot in economy' under the Koizumi regime, but how did the two countries get along? Multilateral and continuous analysis are required.

reference>

1. "the most friendly country" (table)

[http://news.searchina.ne.jp/disp.cgi?y=2008&d=0801&f=research\\_0801\\_001.shtml&pt=large](http://news.searchina.ne.jp/disp.cgi?y=2008&d=0801&f=research_0801_001.shtml&pt=large)

2. "a sense of affinity of Chinese consumers toward Japan and Korea" (table)

[http://news.searchina.ne.jp/disp.cgi?y=2008&d=1230&f=research\\_1230\\_001](http://news.searchina.ne.jp/disp.cgi?y=2008&d=1230&f=research_1230_001)



発表 4

# Korean View of China

by **Kim Sangbae** (Associate Professor, Seoul National University, Political Science and International Relations)

## Preface

### The Rise of China and East Asia in the 21st century

The regional order of East Asia in 2009 saw significant changes brought about by post-modern factors in societies that had been globalized, information-oriented, democratized, regionally integrated and entered the new digital generation. These changes in East Asia were followed by the decline in American hegemony after the post cold-war and the post-post cold-war; the rise of China; the normalization of Japan; and the restoration of Russia as a big power. In view of these developments, East Asian nations are becoming seriously concerned with the rise of China.

Under these circumstances, how does Korea look at the potential and limit of China of the 21st century? How do Koreans perceive the effect in East Asia of the rise of China? Is this the emergence of regional hegemony in the political and military sense? Is this a challenge of a new industrial nation as the 'factory of the world' ? Or is it, one step further, a revival of traditional East Asia?

I would like to present here several points of discussion on the rise of China and its future impact on the 'Korean view of China' ..

### Viewpoint of "Knowledge" and "Network" , thinking in a information-oriented and globalized society

Knowledge and Network lead to a search for new analysis of getting over the game of 'enrich a country and strengthen a military' which are usually presented by the people' s state as the main philosophy of modern international politics.

In other words, as the people' s state, in the case of China, it is necessary to understand the potential and limit of China based on a viewpoint which goes beyond a zero-sum game style of pragmatism wherein China as a nation state is viewed as to whether it is a threat or benefit to the interests of one's country.



In the 21st century, international politics in East Asia is assumed to be more complicated than the power game of 'enrich a country and strengthen a military' – only the politics among modern nations in the 19th century. This assumption is well-connected to the recent debate on international politics among learned society, which pays much attention to the so-called soft power and the transformation of nations.

The potential and the limit of China in the above, are understood to be evaluated based on how they are adapted to technology – informations – knowlegde – culture (summing up “knowledge” ) and “network” those two words are key-words for the politics of the world (in my words, “world politics by knowlegde / network” ).

In this paper, I like to present six themes which are developed from the viewpoints of politics / economics, soft-power, and East Asia network.

## In relation to the Chinese politics/economy

### Discussion Theme 1:

#### Future of Chinese economy, knowledge competitiveness ?

Average rate of economic growth of China is over 9% every year since the reform and the opening of the country to the world. It is nearly three times the world average economic growth of 3.3%. In terms of a scale of economy, Chinese GDP in 2005 was US\$2,234.3 billion, which is the fourth in the world, overtaking England. At the end of 2006, China went up to third rank in world trade following Germany and America.

If they keep such a high growth hereafter, the possibility that they become No. 1, exceeding America and Japan in near future is near to reality. On the other hand, it is also said that such a growth of the Chinese economy may not threaten the surrounding countries. Or rather, a market demand originated from the Chinese economy can also become an opportunity for other countries.

Korea is more and concretely interested in the future of China, as an industrial competitor in such fields that Korea already has competitiveness (for example, manufacturing industries, shipbuilding, home appliances, and automobiles).

The viewpoint is that “within 20 years, China will take all the places where Korea is now operating” . Actually, low priced products made in China are now in the world and East Asian markets. The brand “made in China” or “Chinese made” , however, is associatd with “cheap and unreliable commodities” .

Looking at the above situation, Chinese industries have problems to be solved to overcome the bad image mentioned above. The kernel of this

question is competitiveness of [manufacturing] technology and in the field of IT, and creativity of knowledge and culture which create a brand commodity. All of which add up to what we call 'knowledge competitiveness' . How can China be prepared for knowledge competitiveness on the level of quality which surmount the level of quantities ? What is the future of 'IT China' ? How can they promote new products successfully as a competitor in the new leading sectors?

## Discussion Theme 2:

### The future effect of the policy and the system under national leadership ?

Together with a problem of knowledge competitiveness in the leading sectors, it is important to see the future of the economy and industry of China as to whether they can produce given the surroundings of policy and system which support them effectively, in other words, institutional adjustment.

When we look back at the experience of development of East Asian countries like Japan and Korea, when they pursued an economic growth, the policy and the system of 'developmentalism' which were led by these countries worked effectively. However, once the countries accomplished their objective and became one of the leading groups, the effectiveness of such policy and system became questionable. For example, industrial organization and policy which worked in the manufacturing field showed some limitation in the field of information and IT.

In the middle or after the latter half of the 1990s, an institutional adjustment in the economic model of East Asia brought about the questions. If we say it symbolically; how to get out of a dilemma of 'hardware institution for software technologies' .

Actually, scientific and technological fields in which China stands out recently are the state technologies like space technologies. It is reported that China is having a hard time in the IT and biotechnology fields which need creativity of the private leadership. For example, in the study of biotechnology clarified the ranking genes of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), it was the Canadian research institute, utilizing various cooperation and network, which obtained good results taking over the lead of China in technologies and resources (The Chinese government controlled informations of sample of the virus and of the virus itself) .

Is it possible for China to create NIS (national innovation systems) which support the 'knowledge state' model of the 21st century and the creativity of the private sectors, thereby overcoming the argument of developmentalism in the field of the manufacturing industry ?

## In relation to the Chinese Soft Power

### Discussion Theme 3:

#### An appeal of 'Beijing Consensus' ?

Another issue which we can propose on a par with the story of efficiency of politics and economy is an appeal to the Chinese political system, that is to say, soft power. It is a possibility how the market economy and political authoritarianism can go parallel, in other words; it is the issue of democratizing a political system which supports the market economy. This issue is confirmed by the word 'Beijing Consensus' which was used in the research paper written by Joshua Cooper Ramo of The Foreign Policy Center, England in May 2004.

Beijing Consensus has a meaning counter to 'The Washington Consensus' which was led by America. Washington Consensus was proposed by John Williamson of the IIE (Institute of International Economics) in 1990 showing an economic plan for the solution of economic problems of Latin America. Thereafter, the terms 'Washington Consensus' became a synonym of the policy of new liberalism (as opposed to authoritarianism) which speaks for America, the IMF, and the World Bank. It is the combination of the market economy and the liberal democracy which are the 'global standards' shown by America.

From such context, we can see the development model of China which keeps political authoritarianism stepping up the economic reform and opening is an example which shows an alternative process of the global standard of American style. Actually, Chinese reform and liberalization model are innovative and different from the one in East Europe and Russia. The Beijing Consensus has a good appeal for the ruling leaders of non-democratic countries in Africa and Latin America who want economic growth.

Such a Chinese model, however, can be said to be a style which combines the market economy, which was born in the developing countries in East Asia, and authoritarianism. So, it is not attractive for such countries as Korea which already experienced the model of developing countries as exemplified in the model of dictatorial development by Park Chung-hee. This is because the Beijing Consensus is only collecting the past experiences which Korea had to overcome and is not the model of development for the future.

The political and economic system of Korea showed the possibility of a dynamic (動態的) process which overcome political authoritarianism while keeping a dynamic democracy. We dare to name it as the 'Seoul Consensus'. From such a viewpoint, Seoul Consensus acquires a meaning of 'dynamic and universal model' which give messages to all countries. It is not a static (靜態的) 'special model' which can give only the countries which are in specified phases

and under development.

Looking at such context, the Beijing Consensus does not lose their appeal because it may be sublimated to a universal model overcoming a special model for the countries which are under certain developing phases. In the process of such change, China, however, faces a problem of how to deal with the changes of the political system which possibly result from its continuous economic development.

## Discussion Theme 4:

### Soft Power of Chinese Culture ?

When we talk about the soft power of China we have to refer to the historical and cultural legacies of China. China' s history and civilization are its soft power and assets. Confucian thought attracted much attention as the core value of Chinese civilization which is different from that of Europe. Recently, the Chinese government recognized the value of such cultural soft power and encouraged relevant research and the dissemination of the concept of Chinese soft power at the national level.

Recently, Chinese government perceive the value of such cultural soft power and took a policy that encourage them. They are carrying out the reserch and spreading such concept of Chinese soft power at national level.

Chinese interests in spreading their cultural soft power formed the foundation of the Confucius Institute and cultural diplomacy. This institute is the Chinese cultural center dedicated to the enthusiastic study of the Chinese language and spreading it worldwide. It was founded mainly for the purpose of encouraging world interest in studying the Chinese language and the diffusion of Chinese culture. There are examples of studies of the possibilities of Chinese soft power by European and American scholars such as Joseph Nye. Other examples of the growing prominence of China' s soft power include the Nobel prize for literature in 2000 of Gao Xingjian, the acclaimed movie 'Green Destiny' , the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the NBA basketball player Yao Ming and the increasing number of foreign students and tourists in China.

There are a lot of contents of Chinese culture which are still in the rough. We can say 'analogue contents of digital era' . If we ask metaphorically, is there any Hollywood in Chinese version? Is there a movie which has a story of Chinese heroes who fight for the earth against the attack from the space though there are movies of chivalrous stories ?

There are many aspects in the Chinese culture that need to be refined for presentation from their present analog version in the digital version. For example, is there a Hollywood movie in Chinese version? Is there a Chinese movie with a story-line of Chinese heroes fighting to save the earth from

attacks by aliens from outer space, although there are Chinese movies with western flavor of chivalry?

From the recent example, we cannot escape from the impression that the contents of the Chinese culture originated from the historical perception which is at the same level as that of developing countries based on the nationalistic way of thinking. There is a tendency that soft power politics of culture is 'the conversation of zero-sum game'. For example, correspondence to the relation between China and Korea like the Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (東北工程) and the history of Goguryeo (高句麗), and Chinese nationalism which was proved during the preparation of the Beijing Olympic. Such examples will be the litmus papers for the issue of political transparency as mentioned above or the test case of attractive points for the surrounding countries.

## In relation to the East Asia Network

### Discussion Theme 5:

#### Coodination Power of Chinese diplomacy ?

An argument about the future of China, which is considered as a variable of knowledge and culture, will be connected naturally with the discussion to understand China from the viewpoints of the formation of the network at the level of East Asia. Firstly, if we connect Chinese diplomacy with the argument of East Asia network, China raised their political position as a result of their economic development. In the scale of an expenditure of armaments, China became the fourth, following America, England and France (official announcement of the expenditure of Chinese defense in 2007 was 45 billion dollars). China is the permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations.

On the basis of China's rise in economic and military power its diplomacy has also become an influential factor in international affairs. This ascendant diplomatic influence should be accepted by other East Asian countries as not being incompatible with their own interests. It also entails the responsibility to act as a responsible big power in its relations with international society, keeping its right to speak. It is argued that peaceful means should be used in the effort to achieve diplomatic objectives. Also, China is endeavoring to justify its rise as a world power by proposing its concept of safety and world order, etc.

The new China gave up their negative diplomacy and pursued positive diplomacy by taking part in seeking solutions to international problems fully utilizing their international influence. At the end of the 1990s when

the monetary crisis flared up in East Asia, China exerted its leadership by withholding the devaluation of the renminbi. Recently, they played a positive role as a mediator in the issue of the nuclear weapons of North Korea. There are several examples where they played positive roles in East Asia, taking leadership at the ASEAN+3, SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) etc..

How will the Chinese diplomacy hereafter play a role as an attractive coordinator for the surrounding countries ? How will they accomplish successfully the theme that will make East Asia a network ? We think the increase of such functions of Chinese diplomacy as a coordinator would create a competition with the network led by America which has been functioning as a global standard especially in the latter half of the 20th century.

From such context, Korean interests come to 'the inter-network politics' , namely what kind of function at 'the edge of network' should be played. The theme of 'network diplomacy' which Korea has, between two networks led by America and led by China, became clear. In other words, it will be connected with the function which Korea should play as a switcher between Chinese network which advances the Beijing Consensus and American network which advances a new liberalism.

## Discussion Theme 6:

### The change of regional ordering system of East Asia ?

The rise of China can be understood to mean a 'system change' of the regional order of modern East Asia of the 20th century model. Especially among various visions which appear in the regional order of East Asia in the 21st century, the rise of China has the meaning that make us recall conventional factors of the world order.

Going back historically, the conventional order of East Asia was an imperial order of the concentric circles (帝國的な同心円の秩序). There were some nations in East Asia which achieved the structural principle of imperial sovereignty of a country. The style of those countries was based on the condition of the feudal (冊封) and tributary (朝貢) relations. In the order of the conventional nations, important surrounding nations who had typical relations with the central dynasty were the dynasties of the Chosun peninsula (as well as Vietnam and Okinawa).

After the spread of the modern international order, the order of East Asia experienced a transformation by the shock from an external order. Surrounding countries like Korea and Japan and Vietnam got out of the tributary system and became independent as the equal nations with China. The change which set up their own identities appeared looking at China as the other person whose external appearance was 'the empire of peoples' nation' .

In the latter half of the 20th century, the American style global standard for the basis of modern international politics, which originated from Europe and America, infiltrated into the realm of the traditional East Asian order. Strictly speaking, however, the modern international order of Western style has not materialized in East Asia in the 20th century, and we should say that an order, wherein the traditional and the modern overlap, was functioning.

Recently, in addition, a de-modernized change broke out in East Asia brought about by the globalization, the information revolution, and the democratization. Along with 'the horizontal network' on a national basis, the network on non-national basis like multinational corporations and societies by citizens who are not national performers also proliferated.

To sum up, when we think over the context mentioned above, we can say 'the triple structures of the order' , namely tradition – modern – demodern, is functioning in East Asia in the 21st century .

The rise of China in such context means that the traditional organizational order of East Asia of hierarchical and concentric circles which was formerly considered secondary and relatively less important has regained the spotlight. China, at heart, must be interested in the restoration of a new Chinese order which was marked with stratification and relative concentric circles.

How will China become an attractive programmer of the order of civilization of East Asia in the 21st century? And how will the image of East Asia as designed by China be persuasive to the surrounding countries of East Asia? The order of East Asia in the 21st century will not be a simple restoration of the traditional order nor the stratified and concentric order. As regard the traditional world order, the surrounding East Asian countries were not governed by a central dynasty which had a monopoly of power (or we can say they did not obey the Han Chinese as a race), but obeyed the central dynasty which was the center of the civilization and became a mixture of other civilizations that flowed to the center. In other words China used traditional soft power. In the process of transforming the system of East Asia in the 21st century we expect that China' s use of soft power may become a test case.

## Conclusion:

### The rise of China and the subject of the Academy for East Asia

There are subjects which produce a discussion of the network of East Asia which is opened to the world overcoming the creation level which reflects national interests.

There are subjects which develop a proposition for the cooperation in East Asia, which is non-zero-sum game, simply overcoming the softpower game as an counter or competitive proposition.

There are subjects which develop a proposition for the construction of real regionalism in East Asia or the order of network, overcoming simple competition of hegemony and regionalization.



# Panel Discussion

Facilitator: Kim Woonghee (Associate Professor, Inha University (Korea), Economics & International Trade, SGRA Researcher)

Comment (complementary report)

"Japanese/Korean View of China from the Viewpoint of China"

Lee Gangzha (Professor, Hokuriku University, School of Future Learning)

Panelists

Hirakawa, Hitoshi (Professor of Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University, SGRA Advisor)

Sohn Yul (Associate Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University)

Kawashima, Shin (Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Arts and Science)

Kim Sangbae (Associate Professor, Seoul National University, Political Science and International Relations)

Comment

# Japanese and Korean View of China from the Viewpoint of China

by Lee Gangzhe (Professor of Hokuriku University, Future Learning)

The themes of this forum today are “the regional concept of East Asia” in Japan and Korea, and “their view of China” . My part is as a commentator, but I am not in the position to comment on the professional views presented by the presenters. So I would like to present my personal opinion on an idea of the East Asian Community and the Japanese and Korean View of China

## The interest in the East Asian Community and the view of China seen in the public opinion

I would like to introduce first a result of the questionnaire survey on an image of the future of the East Asian Community. Chart-1, as shown below, was reported in the ‘Asahi Shimbun (newspaper)’ on February 13, 2009 as a result of the co-survey by Asahi and CSIS (American think-tank). The questionnaires were asked to foreign policy specialists of nine countries in Asia and America. We can see a lot of people at the specialist level who have




Chart 1: The future image of the East Asia Community seen in the public opinion

affirmative opinions on the East Asia Community. In particular, we can see the most important thing is the way of thinking that we should 'establish the frame work of trade and community of regional economy' .

In the same survey of the public opinion, the questions about the Japanese and Korean view of China were also asked, as shown in Chart-2. The question 'which country is the most important 10 years later ?' was asked. Against this question, in Korea, 'China' got 53% and 'America' 41%. In Japan, on the other hand, 'China' scored 34% which was 19% lower than Korea and 'America' was 57% which was 16% higher than Korea. We can see a big difference between Korea and Japan about how to see the importance of China and America. And we can see also the perception of Japanese and Korean, both are near China, are relatively lower than that of 9 countries whose average about the




Chart 2: The most important country, 10 years later




Chart 3: The country which threatens most against Asian peace and stability, 10 years later

importance of China and America are 59% and 36.1% respectively.

Another question, as shown in Chart 3, is which country would threaten the Asian peace and stability the most ten years later. In Korea, the answer: 'China' was 56% and in Japan 51%, both figures are more than half of the total. Comparing the figures 38% of 9 countries' average which is under 40%, that of Japanese and Korean perceptions were high. The answer: 'America' was 38% in Korea and only 12% in Japan.

Here is again a difference between Japan and Korea. I presume the high figure of Korea which shows that Korea is threatened by America, comes from the feeling that there will be a possibility of military confrontation between America and North Korea.

## The gap of the view of China and the analysis of its cause

From this report, we come to know that there is a gap, in the view of China, between that of the international world and Japan/Korea. There is another gap in the view of Japan also between the world and China/Korea. There is also another gap between the historical and empirical view of China and the realistic understanding of today' s China. There is a perception in both Japan and Korea as a public opinion that 'strong country ' = 'the country of hegemony' , and there is an uneasy feeling against the rise of China as a world gigantic nation.

We can think over many causes for such perception gaps. I presume there remained vestiges of the Cold War in the East/North Asia despite the cessation of the Cold War in the 80s -90s of the last century. China is being incorporated into the global world after their reform and opening, but they are still keeping their political system under the one-party rule by the communist party. The feeling of distrust against those things remains strong in both Japan and Korea. I think, as another reason, is the thought that our being neighbors geographically may cause trouble. There remained gaps in the historical perception between Japan and China/Korea and this is also one of the reasons.

Under the recent international situation, we can take up a political issue such as an irresponsible statement of some politicians, as representing features of the time, and its biased report by the media that purposely take up the issue in order to raise their audience rating. It is here, I think, based on an inside view of Japan, lies the cause which always creates troubles in the diplomatic arena. Korea has similar features.

As an analysis of the fundamental cause, there remain the strong nationalism and superiority complex of their own country or people in East Asia and such tendency becomes stronger as the shift of power of the nation.

Another fundamental cause is there remains 'the diplomacy on their own value' which represents the way of thinking about the Cold War. Excessive allergic reaction against 'Communism' and 'Communist Party' is always reported in the media. I think the thought of the Cold War remains in Japan and Korea more strongly than in Europe and America. Especially we can see such way of thinking in some persons and politicians in their speeches. Though the world is now developing strategic diplomacy having big interests in East Asia and China, I have a feeling, living in Japan, that Japan and Korea have strong public opinions that, although having a big interest in China, have opposing opinions of a threat from China. It is strange to me that there is little criticism against an opinion of the new version of the old (more than hundred years) argument for the 'de-Asianization' (Datsu-A Ron = 脱亜論) which appear regularly in weekly magazines. The argument for 'the de-Asianization' can be understood partly if we consider the situation of Japan a hundred years ago. But we cannot think now over the future of Japan without considering its relation with Asia, so it will be obviously an anachronism to emphasize it [de-Asianization]. The tendencies of the public opinion that is stirred up by the sentiments of anti-China and anti-Korea as a counter to the sentiment of anti-Japan will be a drawback for the future of Japan and Asia.

## 'Dango 3 Kyodai (Three Brothers), the change and stability of their power relationship'

When I look at three countries, Japan, China and Korea, I recall the 'three brothers' . As the words 'Dango 3 Kyodai (three brothers)' were once very popular in Japan and we can observe the relation among the three countries using this word.

During these 20 years, from the 20th to the 21st century, the relation among those three countries changed so much and I think the main factor for this change lies basically in the change of the balance of power of the countries.

Japan developed to be the second in the world economy, but by the strong catching up of Korea and the rapid rise of China, Japan lost their predominant position which continued since its modernization. After the collapse of the bubble, Japan entered the lost decade and it seems the tendencies of conservatism which came from the lack of self-confidence became strong.

China, 30 years after its reforms and opening, rose to third place in the world economy, and their comprehensive national power exceeded Japan. They promoted their national strategy 'enrich the nation and strengthen the army' , and it was regarded as a threat by the surrounding countries. As a

result, there is a possibility of an aroused consciousness or the ideology of Great Sino-centrism.

Korea, on the other hand, succeeded in its economic growth and catching up to the advanced countries, and we can see the tendencies of nationalism (the rise of Small Sinocentrism) together with the dream of economic big power. There remained the strong consciousness that the Korean culture shall be positioned at a higher rank than that of Japan.

When we look at those three nations, it seems the consciousness of rivalry among them became stronger in these few decades. Before modernization, China was in the superior position in rank, but in these hundred years of modernization, Japan was in the superior position. Today, however, such ranking has become vague. Since those 'Dango Three Brothers' put their energy into the competition of ranking, they cannot unite into one 'Dango' as the result of moving separately and this seems to be weakened. If they can cooperate closely with each other, they can be a big power of East Asia which can compete with the European and American powers. In these few decades, these three countries rose in their position developing rapidly in the economy of the international world. It is a problem that, despite a strengthening of interdependency in trade and economy, the binding power is weak.

## 'The Way to Go in the 21st Century'

Building of the East Asian Community is still in an idea stage. As the ASEAN Community is declared to be established in 2015, I think Japan, China and Korea are requested to perform the core function cooperatively to establish the East Asia Community and it is the only way that East Asia can survive in the severe global competition.

I believe building of the East Asia Community should be promoted on the basis of equality, reciprocal altruism and peaceful coexistence which are, regardless of the size of countries, the common theme. Especially, I think, Japan, China and Korea have common base in the thought of East Asia. Such base was told, in the past, the Confucian culture area, culture area of Chinese character and Chinese culture area, but those cultures are no longer monopolized by China but are already fixed in the Chosun Peninsula and Japanese society.

Using the words by Confucius who was a saint 2500 years before, I like to propose a guide to the establishment of the Community;

“求大同、存小異” (in order to seek for a common and big target, little difference shall be put on the side)

“大行不拘小節” (to do a great work, do not be particular about trifles)

“君子和而不同、小人同而不和” (a man of virtue will harmonize but will not

be identical,

a man of small caliber will be identical but will not harmonize)


“大事化小、小事化了” (big issue shall be made small, and small issue shall be null)

The words by Confucius are important as a guide for the management of the relationship of peoples, but I believe, for the management of international relationship also, these words are very helpful.

I would like to end my comment here.







■ Kim North East Asian, Prof. Lee! Thank you very much for your enthusiastic comments.

As to the procedure of this discussion, please comment on or pose a question to other speakers' announcement for about 3 minutes.

■ Hirakawa I like to ask about the issue of 'Soft Power' , which was presented in the Korean View of China by Dr.Kim Sangbae and East Asia Regionalism by Dr.Sohn Yul, both from Korea. Though I am not a specialist on international politics, it is said in Japan that the culture become popular with the appearance of the middle class. I think it is a different situation in Europe and America. Japanese animations and comics are accepted in Asia, and Japanese women chase Korean movie stars as a result of the boom of the Korean Way, and the movies of Taiwan and HongKong are accepted in South East Asia and Japan. Hollywood movies are certainly accepted but there has been a revival of Asian movies, which are accepted by Asian peoples. There are discussions that the power is mutually accepted as something Asian, rather than having the power of one country become strong. I think I could not hear such opinion today. There might be some, but are there any arguments on this subject in the learned societies in Korea?

■ Song I have one question to Dr. Hirakawa.

When I recently looked at a discussion on Japanese regional concept, the theory of East Asian Community was actively discussed during the 5 years under Prime Minister Koizumi. Later, the theory of a democratic alliance, or that we should form an alliance among democratic countries was talked about under Prime Minister Abe. And, under Prime Minister Fukuda, the concept of the inland sea (内海論) or that we should enlarge the idea of Asia/Pacific arose. I think those arguments are not defined as the concept of East Asia Community. The concept changed whenever the Prime Minister changed.

As the Japanese Prime Minister changed so often, it gives the surrounding countries a feeling that the regional concept also changed so often. How do we accept it ? Is it just a level of concept ? Or is it a change of identity, or it comes from an underlying feeling of crisis? What do you think ?

Kim I like to collect all the answers later.  
Dr. Kawashima, please proceed.

Kawashima I was requested for any comment on the opinions of the Korean side.  
Dr. Lee mentioned the Tiananmen Square Protests. What I am interested in is the trend of the opinion in Korea on the Tiananmen Square Protests. It was in 1992 when China and Korea normalized their diplomatic relations. Actually, in 1988 the Seoul Olympic was held and the Republic of China sent a delegation of players and their relations became closer. Though, the Tiananmen Square Protests occurred in 1989, their good relations were kept and in 1992 the diplomatic relations were normalized. Amidst the international sanctions against China, Korea and China normalized their diplomatic relations. It is a big difference with Japan which altered their view of China after the Tiananmen Square Protests. I have a feeling that Korea and Japan cannot have a common view of China especially after a shock like the Tiananmen Square Protests. Today, nobody from the Korean side mentioned about it, and it made me feel the Korea and Japan are different, as I thought.

Both of you reported on the basis of so-called 'Beijing Consensus' which Dr. Ramo of the Foreign Policy Centre in UK proposed . You both pointed out the possibilities and limits of the Beijing Consensus. I understand you proposed any necessities when China would give full play to their diplomatic or adjustment power.

Based on the above, I have two questions. Based on your report 'East Asia' may include Southeast Asia, or ASEAN + 3 and understood as East Asian Community. In this case there is a big difference in your concept of the East Asia as being composed of Japan, China and Korea and the concept of East Asia as including Southeast Asia. Today' s discussion is not clear on this issue. My question is: should Southeast Asia be included in the discussion of East Asia, particularly with respect to the issue of Chinese leadership in the region? Please give your separate opinions to these questions.

The My second question refers to Dr. Lee' s report that China' s formulation of the Beijing Consensus is based on two factors, namely the historical context and Confucianism. On this basis, I think it is important to understand the intellectual depth and conviction of the present leaders of China who make political decisions. How deep is their knowledge of history? Are they familiar with the past feudal tribute system? Do they understand the history of China

and its surrounding neighbors? These aspects could be studied from history.

On the other hand, I think, Confucianism is very difficult. Many words and ideas could be understood differently by different readers. For example, there is the issue that Confucianism could be the basis for the Beijing Consensus or for an international order in East Asia. I think the right to interpret any ambiguity in Confucianism should belong to China. As there is a long traditional history in Confucianism in Korea, you might think you are an authority on this. In Japan, however, there might be a controversy if we put Confucianism as our central philosophy and that China will finally get the right to the correct interpretation. My second question is: What is your opinion?

**Kim** I have one question each to Dr. Kawashima and Dr. Hirakawa. Firstly, a question to Dr. Kawashima. You talked about the view of China by ordinary people. I like to know what do the Japanese learned societies study in the theoretical field and in the field of idealism.

To Dr. Hirakawa, I like to ask about the Community, as I learned a lot from you. You pointed out that ‘usually, when we talk about the Community, we have to bear in mind the society which we can call ourselves “we” , which is a harmony of identity in each organization. However, we are not in such stages as we have just started in East Asia.’ I have the impression that you argue about East Asia Community at a far developed stage. I think we are already in the middle, though we can not yet call it ‘the Community’ , and it is possible to realize the goal within a short time. Please introduce any ideas in Japan which are helpful for us.

**Sohn** I have an additional question to Dr. Kawashima. You said the interests by Japanese students in China ‘dropped sharply’ . What do you think about is the reason for this?

**Kim** I like to open the discussion to the floor. Since Mr. Kawasaki from Asahi Shimbun Asia Network is here, I like to have his comment.

**Kawasaki** I am the Secretary-General of Asahi Shimbun Asia Network. I was excited to hear your opinions, as I have been a journalist for about 20 years.

As today's theme is Japan, China and Korea, I like to say a word briefly. I believe all of you understand how important the relations among Japan and China and Korea is. And I like to remember the change in these countries in the past 20 years.

It was the summer of 1982 when I first visited Korea; that was 26 years ago. The Park (Chung -hee) regime had already collapsed, but Korea was still under a military rule. What had been the changes in Korea since then? In 1987 South

Korea became a democracy. In 1991 South and North Korea joined the United Nations; and in 1992 both Koreas established diplomatic relations with China. And now one of their citizens has been elected Secretary-General of the United Nations. I have reported on these historic developments and their surprising speed especially in South Korea.

In 1988, one year before the Tiananmen Square Protests, I went to China for my first visit to that country. When I arrived in Beijing from Europe, I could not sleep well due to jet lag and the time difference, so I strolled around Jianguomen Street at around four o' clock in the morning. I saw millions of people pedaling on bicycles on the one-way street. The people wore Mao-suits. Since then I have visited Beijing many times. When I visited Beijing last year after the Olympic Games, I could not help feeling nostalgic for the million bicycles which I saw during my first visit, as compared with the present proliferation of automobiles.

I am now living in the area of Nishi-Kasai of Tozal-line (in the eastern part of Tokyo) with a mixed population of Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Indian nationalities. When I think of the changes in Japan, China and Korea during the past 20 to 30 years, I imagine that our mutual perception of each other as individuals is not directly related to our perception of such policies as regionalism and regional community.

I have been in charge of the opinion page of Asahi Shinbun before I was shifted to the Asia Network last May. We carried the translated column by Bill Emmott for one and a half year. Bill Emmott is English and the ex-chief editor of the Economist. He published last spring the book 'Rivals' which contained a lot of the materials in his columns mentioned above. The Japanese version of this book is "Asian 'Record of Three Kingdom (三国史)', Big Strategy of China, India and Japan" . I am sorry to say that Korea is not included, but he says those three rivals, Japan, China and India, become a big factor in the world hereafter. He analyses the socio-economic gap of each country, population, their culture and histories.

I think Japan, China and Korea hereafter became good friends who helped each other in solving their problems. Apart from the plan of policies, when we think what is the concrete way of cooperation, we think of a cooperation in currency and trade for example. I think the most important cooperation is in the area of environmental problems. How do Korea and China react to the post-Kyoto Protocol and how can Japan, China and Korea cooperate with each other on these issues ? There are also non-traditional security problems such as pandemics or piracy.

I think our North Eastern Asia will develop closer relationship through cooperation as mentioned above or by conducting top-level meetings among Japan, China and Korea.

I think, looking at graphic charts presented by Dr. Kawashima, we have to think how to get along with our neighbours including my neighbours in Nishi-Kasai, because Japan, China and Korea cannot be separated now, though we cannot escape from the feelings that the more we know about China, the more a feeling of hate increases.

I want you to reply whether China is really cooperating with us in the environmental problems.

**Watanabe** I like to confirm basic and simple facts, namely relationships of the tribute as mentioned by Dr. Kim and Dr. Kawashima. Dr. Kim said, in his discussion of theme 6, 'the change of the system in the regional order of East Asia?' that 'the nations as 'Korea, Japan and Vietnam get out of the system of the tribute, , , , ' . From my viewpoint of ordinary people, I think Japan is a little bit different from the other countries. Is there such an understanding among academicians?

Another question to Dr. Lee: there is a phrase 'a violence of the medias' in your presentation 'the point of issue: misunderstandings and prejudice' . Please explain in more detail.

**Fukuda** It may be a little different viewpoint, but I had a feeling, listening to Dr. Kawashima, that there are no real Chinese as there are no real American in the States and the Chinese diversity is different from that of Japan and Korea.

The reason why America and China are, in a sense, very close to each other is the Japanese understanding and thinking that their markets or promising futures are akin to each other. This kinship is different from that of Japan and Korea. Most Japanese think of themselves as Japanese, but Americans do not think of themselves as Americans, but rather as Anglo-Saxon, German, Italian etc. Is China in a similar situation?

Though I do not know China well, people in Korea and Japan lose their temper if they are called Japanese or Korean. But in China, it becomes 'which area of China?' 'I am a Chinese. But whom are you talking about?' It seems they speak well about Chinese, but I think it is a different sense. I like to have your opinion on this way of thinking.

**Yamamoto** I always feel an admiration for the activity of Atsumi International Scholarship Foundation. Today' s presentations by all of you gave me good references.

I am very much interested in today' s theme, China, Korea and Japan, because I have been involved in the work of the international cultural exchange as a managing director and secretary-general of the international scholarship foundation of the Fuji Bank.

Recently a lady, who is an OG of our foundation and now deputy professor of a national university in Japan and got her doctorate from the University

of Tokyo, told me 'it is serious in Korea now because China is getting more powerful' . I told her it is very important how each of us should consider, as members of the peoples' society. In such meaning, I have a concept of the symbiotic society.

As reported at the Beijing Olympic Games, there are a lot of issues in China. Among such issues, it is very important for each individual to live rightly respecting their human rights and we, as a constituent of our society, have to talk further from such viewpoints. It will be the same either to Chinese, Korean and Japanese, so I think we like to discuss further on such viewpoints.

It is quite natural that big enterprises of the world are now building factories in China. It is also natural to seek for low cost of labours from the principle of the capitalism. What I like to say is that human beings should become equally affluent. In short, I can say that equalization should be a goal of the society. So, in Japan, I keenly feel that we should discuss, as one human being, the basic idea that affluent people should become relatively fewer instead of complaining about the emergence of China. I like to have your opinions.

**Gong** I think the present East Asia is in the situation where we cannot see it becoming like EU which is a perfect community.

Dr. Hirakawa pointed out in his handout on page 15 saying that 'in Japan, there are some people who oppose the East Asia community saying that it smacks of Chinese hegemony' . What are the grounds for an opposition against a formation of an East Asian community ?

Dr. Lee pointed out and proposed a conclusion 'The way to the 21st Century' . It seems that it is an appeal to the people in China. Japan and Korea to take a positive position for the East Asia community, but, on the other hand, it also seems that the Chinese perception is a bit different. How is the perception in China for the necessity of the East Asia community ?

**Schulatov** I think it is impossible to discuss about East Asia without including North Korea. I like to question about Chinese view of Japan and Korea including the issue of North Korea. How do Japan and Korea evaluate the Chinese position on the issue of North Korea ? I would be appreciate if you can advise me how the Korean people evaluate Chinese position, and how Japanese people evaluate it as a policy, though when we say Chinese view, it is an opinion.

**Machida** As I teach at a university, I ask you on the assumption that our students may raise such questions. I apologize if I hurt your feelings.

Firstly, you talked about Confucianism, but how do the ordinary people or students in China, Japan and Korea, understand at their level the Confucian view ? Another question is, to Dr. Kim and Dr. Sohn, when there would be

Japanese textbook controversies in Korea, the Korean government imposes a limit to public interchange. The government issues warnings. How do we explain to our students such Korean admonitions of Japan ?

**Kim** Thank you very much for your questions. As time is limited, I ask you to answer in two minutes each.

**Hirakawa** Dr. Sohn Yul said that the position on East Asia Community changes as the reins of government change. I think this is correct. And you should not mind or need not be nervous about the differing positions. There would be many arguments when you are asked to understand the varied positions.

I think the Japanese policy on Asia is influenced by Japan' s relation with America. I understand each Prime Minister of Japan and other politicians, for that matter, have their own opinion. Present Prime Minister Aso, when he was the Foreign Minister in 2006, proposed an arc of freedom and prosperity by which he tried to surround China. An important factor in his concept was his values. As somebody said today, if the Japanese government adopts a policy based on a certain set of values, it antagonizes other countries which may have a different set of values. I think such a policy would not be acceptable in the international society which has a variety of values. Values are important, but if these are emphasized in the proposed community joint community works become impossible to accomplish from the beginning. By the same token, we cannot establish the community unless China abandons their present regime.

The theory of East Asia community actually thrusts upon Japan an issue/theme that requires a reconsideration of its international diplomatic policy in the light of the big change of the Asian political economy in relation to the international structure. Under such circumstances we can understand that the leader of each regime adopts different policies in relation to those of other Asian countries. It is important that the present regime realizes that it cannot escape nor ignore this issue/theme.

As we discuss diplomacy as the main theme on the assumption that the present economic situation which has a close relationship and heavy dependence on China, we cannot part from China nor ignore its framework as a nation. Nor can we build a stable cooperative relationship which jumps over the modern systems of nations. So, I think we have to discuss carefully in considering such points. The Japanese proposals on the East Asia Community by Prime Minister Koizumi or others were intended to check an initiative by China. But, we should look at a positive side which will form a new order in East Asia and give it a chance to build new relationships of mutual trust and form new societies that will span beyond national borders.

As to the question of Dr. Kim about a possibility of materialization of the

Community, I am afraid I may have misled him: I do not think the Community is very far from realization. We should continue a joint work for the Community and in such a process of the work, the Community may materialize earlier than expected. People, who oppose or feel skeptical about the Community, often say that it is difficult to materialize because national borders in Asia are higher than that of Europe. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, we should start from what we can do now functionally, without saying it is difficult to materialize if we cannot overcome such difficulties. It is important to make a continuous effort to attain the goal of common ideal of the future which seems to be impossible now.

I think the Six-Party Talks on the issue of North Korea, for example, would be held essentially among five, not six, nations but, regrettably, the five by themselves would be unable to have control in Asia. So, America is involved. There is a nuclear issue behind these talks, but this is because of the world order after the War. I think relationships of mutual trust among people of the East Asian countries will be developed some time in the future from such difficult but very important talks.

We should not start our history from the assumption that the Community is impossible or not good to form. A lot of discussion, including the issue of the Community, started from the past. That is to say, all started from the issue of Confucianism, the issue of Asia, the issue of big economical gap and the issue of diversity of cultures. It is only a theory of affirmation of the present conditions which like to work out the future by historical determinism. We have to establish, on the contrary, a relationship of mutual trust having common goals. I like to question inversely how to build the East Asia Community which have a lot of diversities.

I think we cannot build the Community if we do not think a great deal of our race or birth and if we can build the Community only when we abandon our individualism.

I think the Community should be a framework which protect our dignity, whether the countries or the race are small, whether the countries have glorious history or not, whether the countries are economically developed or not. I cannot agree to foresee the future from the past.

■ Sohn There were a many questions, and I will reply to only one question. The question is how the Beijing Consensus was accepted by Japan, China and Korea. Dr. Kawashima said if we include South-East Asia, it would be a different story. I agree with him.

In other words, soft power is versatile. For example, an idea may be accepted by one country, but may be rejected by the other countries.

There are records of many researches. If we compare, for example, an appeal



of one country with a global appeal (in the case of Japan), we find that global appeals carry more weight than regional ones. In other words, as Japan excels in Asia, the West is attracted to it. But Asia, especially North East Asia like China and Korea do not feel so attractive.

Today, we have looked at the Japanese and Korean views of China; the reality is that the image of China became gradually bad. There appeared a gap between the global and 'non-global' appeal. This is an answer to the question of why it is difficult to form a community in East Asia. I think it is wrong for a government to restrict the public exchange of ideas, when textbook controversies or issues of history are raised. When the national or local government takes such action, I think the students or ordinary people in Korea do not always react against it. It is important to picture the negative aspects of soft power at the level of policy makers or diplomats. I am not trying to justify the policy which do not allow exchange of ideas with Japan, but this exchange is problematic and is negatively reacted or rejected in Korea. I like to stress this point.

**Kawashima** Before I respond to Dr. Sohn' s question , if there is enough time, I like to further discuss this point with him. There is a possibility of a gap between the global and regional image of China. The world at large and the West appreciate the various contributions of China, but its neighboring countries have bad feelings toward it. The situation arising from these bad feelings can gradually glow like a small fire, but can burst to flame. I think it is important to understand how this situation impacts the Security Treaty between Japan and America and the relationship between Korea and America. This is a comment not an answer.

I now answer the question from Dr. Kim about researches in Japan. However, if I explain fully it will take time, so I will explain just one point. Ms. Hiroko Maeda, a researcher of the PHP Research Institute collected and arranged numerous data on cases about China. Since it is a good report I recommend that you read it. You can download it from her home page.

Dr. Sohn asked me why Japanese students have lost interest in China. I can explain from two sides. One is an explanation from globalization, and the other is the increase of the numbers of people who do not like to be involved in the movements including anti-Japan protests. Students move to the direction that they do not like to be involved because they believe Chinese people hate Japan. I think students who are cost-conscious do not do anything troublesome.

To Mr. Kawasaki, I like to point out one thing. Chinese people believe that China itself is still a developing country. They are in an unprecedented position, namely they are one of big economic powers in the world, but they are still

developing.

So, they keep saying, that in the field of the environment, they behave as a developing country. At the summit meeting in Lake Toya, China delivered an official statement together with other developing countries. When Japan and China discussed this problem, they acted as a developed country and developing country, respectively, though they are both big powers. This behaviour affects many aspects.

We always controvert whether America and China are alike. We compare these countries in many aspects, such as in terms of homogeneity or the size of the countries. There is always such controversies that America respects China because the latter has a long history and its own culture. I am not sure about it, but when I entered Beijing from India, I felt that Beijing is really homogeneous. When I compare New York, New Delhi and Beijing, I think Beijing is most homogeneous. This may be only a personal impression.

As regard the issue of living together, I completely agree. But I notice such newspaper articles as an Uyghul student, who studied at the University of Tokyo more than ten years ago, was recently released, and a Korean (in China) researcher of certain think-tank was arrested for the information about North Korea, which was reported by the Asahi Shinbun this Tuesday or by the Sankei Shinbun this Wednesday. Both are a friends of mine and my junior, so this incident hurt me.

As to the Chinese policy about North Korea, it is important to consider how Japan evaluates it. At the level of speech and media, not at the level of researchers, the issue of North Korea is focused on the abduction of Japanese by North Koreans, and because of this it is difficult to rightly analyze the issues of nuclear weapons, Chinese contribution or whether North Korea collapses or not. In Japan, people tend to discuss the issue of North Korea together with the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals and became top news as reported by Mr. Wang Jiarul to Secretary General Kim Jong-il. I think this is a cause of the gap in reality.

**Kim Sangbae** I was asked many questions. As it is difficult to answer all, I like to discuss only four points.

There is a variety of researched opinions, but it is necessary to verify whether these are absolutely correct or not. Is the perception of Japan, China and Korea by the elite and ordinary people the same based on their experiences?

I think the idea or ideology of the elite is presented to the public which just accept the idea. I think the perception of China should be different between the elite and the common people because of their different experiences. I think it is necessary to harmonize the different perceptions (due to different experiences) in a comprehensive manner in order to attain cooperation.

However these perceptions are not fixed and there is room for constructive cooperation. Establishing this cooperation is a function of the leadership of Japan, China and Korea and also of the public.

The second point is the spatial scope of East Asia asked by Dr. Kawashima. There are many arguments about the spatial scope of East Asia, North-East Asia, Asia or Asian-Pacific. What I like to talk about today is to change the idea of such spatial scope rather than the spatial scope itself. Generally, we discuss in international politics, about geopolitics which is for the spatial and regional science. Both are the concept from the hard-power. The concept of the 21st Century is more solid and is able to understand other spaces which are made of the knowlegde and the idea of network. There is naturally a spatial scope of knowledge. There is also a space of imagination or a space of spirit. These spaces do not exist separately and exist comprehensively. We can say the space of East Asia can be built of diverse individual interests. It is difficult to cooperate in East Asia only by the modern viewpoint of hard power. Such a change has to be generated from the ideas of many people. And the core of this should include the issue of how East Asia is taken up.

The third point is the tribute system. This is very important for Japan, China and Korea. Actually when we talk about the tribute system from the political viewpoint of modern nations, we easily think of a class society in which a country pays tribute to a superior country. This is thought to be an unequal relationship. I think a tribute is traditionally one of the systems in the international society, and the people at that time did consider inequality from the modern standpoint nor was it demeaning.

In this sense, China has a special relationship with Korea and Taiwan. Japan was in a loose tribute system and tied up with Korea and Vietnam by a special relationship of different type. Since China opened its ports in the 19th Century, a tribute system, which was one of the systems to maintain the traditional and international order, collapsed together with the destruction of the relationship with China. Korea, Japan and Vietnam have developed at a different style. It is an important theme from the nostalgic standpoint.

What I like to explain lastly is how to understand China in the North Korean issue. I think it is necessary to change the way of thinking. The Six-Party Talks initiative is made of the network of six persons and this network is connected in various directions. The total structure was made from the network of this linkage. We can say one of the keys which would solve the issue of North Korea in East Asia is the network of the Six-Party. At the same time, we have to understand the type of network of the participants are different from each other. It is North Korea that is the so-called missing-link among the Six-Party network. From the standpoint of Korea, Japan and Russia, their linkage to North Korea is not strong, as compared with the relatively strong linkage of

China. It means that there is a special function which China can give full play in the Six-Party network. When we discuss about the relationship between Japan and North Korea from the recent standpoint, it will be an interesting idea that it is necessary to consider Chinese functions in the network.

Lee As time is limited, I will explain briefly. There are two things that surprised me since I came to Japan. One is that Japanese read "Analects" more than Chinese do. Another thing is that most Japanese read "Das Kapital" . Since I came from a socialist country, I thought Japan is a country of capitalism.

It is said that almost all the university students in the 1950s and 1960s have read "Das Kapital" . There was a big difference between the image of Japan as seen from outside and the one which I have actually seen.

With regard to Korea, in Korea there is a society of family line of Confucius who wrote "Analects" , with a membership in Korea of around 2.7 million. I think this figure exceeds that of a similar society in China.

What I like to say is the culture of Confucius or Confucianism which originated from China is not a monopoly of China. Korea and Japan took in Confucianism unconsciously or consciously during their long histories.

Proverbs or 'four-character idiomatic phrases' are one of the culture or way of thinking of Japanese, which are imbued in the Japanese body and soul. Where do these proverbs come from ? When I worked part-time in Japan, I quoted such idioms and was asked 'are there similar idioms in China ?' And I replied 'these originally came from China' . There are many Japanese who do not know such culture, which is ingrained in daily life, has some connection with China, though it has been taken from China in the past.

When we think over the future of East Asia, it is important to understand that the culture of Confucianism is not always that of the Chinese but also a part of the culture or the way of thinking in Japan and Korea. As Dr. Hirakawa said, when we build up a target, it is better to think of common points first. And I think his observation is important to consider on how to cooperate and understand each other.

As to 'a violence of the media' , what I like to say is that the media suppresses public opinion or any viewpoints with their strong power (it is said to be a 'the fourth power' ) and put pressure on the opinions which oppose the media when they had some biased opinion. In Japan, when they talk about 'the issue of North Korea' or 'the North Korean abduction of Japanese' , public opinion becomes one-sided and we cannot form calm and objective public opinions which should analyse objectively. This is also one example of the violence of the media. In case of China, the communist party controls the media and suppresses the news which are disadvantageous to Chinese society and the communist party. It is nothing else than the violence by the power of

politics and the media.

■ Kim Listening to all the opinions, I feel how important it is, when we think over the East Asian Community, to harmonize the soft power and cooperation.



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## ■ Kim Sangbae

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34th SGRA Forum Report  
8th Asian Future Forum of Japan and Korea

# East Asian Regional Concept and Chinese View of Japan and Korea

On February 21st (Sat.), 2009, the 8th Japan and Korea Asia Future Forum was held at Tokyo International Forum on the theme “East Asian Regional Concept and Chinese View of Japan and Korea” . Since the last Guam Forum, we have kept in mind the key concept “East Asian Cooperation” and “Soft Power” , and took notice of the difference of the view of China by Japan and Korea. We decided to continue to discuss further and more concretely and today we like to think of the East Asian concept of Japan and Korea from the viewpoint of comparison. We provided the opportunity to discuss the difference between Japan and Korea on the Chinese view.

Following the opening address by Mrs. Junko Imanishi, representing SGRA and Mr. Lee Jin Kyu, the President for Future Human Resource Studies, four speakers reported on their researches. Firstly, Dr. H. Hirakawa, of the Nagoya University, clarified mainstream Asia-ism in Japan, classifying the idea from the actual situation, and explained its special features from the 20th century up to now. Relating to a recent boom of the East Asia Community, he emphasized that the present time is not a repetition of the historical Japanese standpoint on the idea of the East Asia Community but is a consideration of American interests and a restraint of China.

Dr. Sohn Yul, Yongsei University, clarified the the regionalism of Korea given the differing views of Japan and China on the scope of the region, characteristics, identities and methodology. He emphasized the role of Korea, as a middle power and as a “balancer” Dr. Shin Kawashima, of the University of Tokyo, summarized, ‘the details of the Chinese view of Japan’ based on the result of his researches for 30 years and updated to the recent time. He emphasized the Chinese view of Japan that the world is divided into three spheres of influence: that is Orient/Japan/the West and that this view continued to postwar Japan and, as a result of the Chinese recent rise in influence. Japan has reacted negatively against China. Recently, negative opinion against China has become predominant in Japan. Distrust of China comes from the feeling that China is becoming a threat to Japanese daily life,



not from a political perspective nor of historical perception.

As the last reporter, Dr. Kim Sam Bae, of Seoul University, addressed ‘the “Chinese View of Korea”’. He asserted, that based on his opinion the world politics in East Asia in the 21st century should take notice of the soft power and transformation of the nation and people., Chinese possibilities and their limits which are derived from his opinion mentioned above, are evaluated by how they are adapted to the two key words of world politics of the 21st century, namely ‘the knowledge’ (collectively technology, information, knowledge and culture) and ‘the network’.

Dr. Lee Gangzha, of Hokuriku University and a SGRA researcher, at the panel discussion on the Chinese view of Japan and Korea, emphasized his position “求大同、存小異” (‘be much alike / general resemblance / substantial identities’) by explaining the perception gaps between the Chinese view of Japan / Korea and the international perception, and the gaps between Japanese view of China / Korea and the international perception, and the gaps between the Chinese view and the real China.

There were many opinions besides the above from the panels or the floor, but an exchange of such opinions was regrettably carried over to the social gathering due to limitation of time.

We, together with the 67 participants, were able to finish this forum successfully. I think this success owes much to the participation of the ex-scholarship students of the Atsumi International Exchange of Scholarship which willingly accepted the ‘heavy burden’ as simultaneous interpreters. I like to express my thanks to them here. In the past, after the forum the participants changed to frenzied drinking parties, but this year we finished very soberly because of the global financial crisis.

I am looking forward to meeting you again next year.

#### ■ Kim Woonghee

Graduated from Seoul University. Obtained his Master’s and Ph.D from the International Public Policy Program of the Tsukuba University. Dissertation was on “Research on the Government Advisory Bodies as a Permeative Network of Approval Procurement”. After being posted at the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute is currently an Associate Professor in the International Commerce Department of Inha University. Promotes the Japan-Korea Future Forum as a Research Consultant at the Institute of Human Future and SGRA

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